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A review and assessment of the contribution of international and bilateral aid to urban development policies in Tanzania

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The rationale for aid

Up to the 1950's economic resources were selected and transferred from the developed to the developing countries mainly by private enterprise for private profit. Since 1960 transfers have been organized mostly by governments and international agencies in the public interest. The risks and costs have, therefore, come to fall on taxpayers in donor and recipient countries and less on private business.

Aid is not well understood in either the donor or the recipient countries; in the former it is popularly supposed to be pure philanthropy and in the latter neo-colonialism and imperialism. Aid is an enormous stride in world history because it offers a chance for international co-operation to organize the mutual economic and political interests of developing and developed countries rationally and constructively. For many years to come, aid of the right amount and kinds, effectively used, is indispensable to growth in the international economy and stability in world order. Success, however, cannot be won without maintaining and increasing official aid.¹

It would be extremely hard and take many years for developing countries to make social and economic progress on their own with internal savings and domestic investment or even with the help of foreign trade and private investment. They simply will not be able to accumulate enough capital and earn foreign exchange.

The foreign private investor normally will not invest in the kinds of agricultural and industrial development and social and economic infrastructure which are so vital to balanced economic and social growth, but costly in foreign exchange. Private investors usually go for investment in minerals and oil where productivity and profits are high and quick. Therefore, official aid (apart from supplementing internal savings, foreign trade and private investment) is used to build social and economic infrastructure, for example, transport and communications, power, water supply, technical and professional education, administrative services, etc. This increases the capacity for a country to absorb capital profitably and enables developing countries to satisfy adequately the rising expectations of their people.

Improved public works and services also help to integrate the national economy, thus promoting national unity and political stability. The infrastructure enables the creation of more opportunities for employment and raising the living standards.

Official assistance can act as insurance against neo-colonialist rivalry and the revival of imperialism and its risks to international peace. Aid helps to prevent outside intervention in internal politics by helping economic and social construction of the developing countries. In fact, developed countries could divert money from their defense budgets to aid in order to safeguard their interests abroad. This certainly is cheaper than costs of preparation for or actual war. The overall total global defense expenditure is now in excess of \$430 billions a year, with an estimated 36 million men in the world's regular forces, another 25 million in the reserves, and some 30 million civilians in military related occupations. The talents of some 500,000 scientists and engineers throughout the world are mobilized in weapon research and development.²

Official aid also acts as a multiplier in the growth of the world economy. The donor can subsidize his exports, get rid of his surplus manufactures, relieve his distressed areas and keep full employment. If world resources could be brought into full production the chances for the prosperity of the donor would multiply.

Technical assistance is particularly essential in strengthening the technical, administrative and managerial cadres to improve the capacity to plan, coordinate and control development. This will ensure a reasonable rate of growth, servicing of foreign debts and political stability. Aid should be used to strengthen the economy and government.

For Tanzania the expectation is that aid will facilitate the execution of many of its social and economic development programs in addition to bridging its balance of payments deficit.

The framework for foreign aid in Tanzania

Tanzania, through the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and the Party Guidelines of 1971, has opted for development through socialism and self-reliance. That twin development objective has clearly meant three things:

1. The nationalization of all the major means of production and putting them under public control.
2. The democratic, and effective participation of workers and peasants in all production decisions.

3. Relying on the country's efforts and resources for her own development, and especially ensuring that those resources are used for the purpose of meeting the needs of the people.

Of the three principles of socialism and self-reliance, the first seems to cause the least difficulties. The second is a logical consequence of the first. Indeed it is widely recognized that it is not enough to nationalize all the major means of production and put them under public control. As it has often been pointed out, nationalization per se can very well lead to state capitalism instead of socialism. State capitalism leaves the workers and peasants alienated and widens the gap between the leaders and the led.

The third aspect of Tanzania's development principle appears to have caused the most discomfort. The basic problem arises from the fact that self-reliance is often equated with self-sufficiency. On the one hand, self-sufficiency implies that a country's requirements are fully met by her own resources without exporting or importing anything from outside. In its purest sense, therefore, there is no country which can claim to be completely self-sufficient, even though the degree of dependence on outside sources varies from country to country. On the other hand, self-reliance means that a country depends upon her own resources and efforts to meet her requirements. This implies that a country can still be self-reliant in view of her natural resource endowment, producing for instance, beef in exchange for oil and other petroleum products. Similarly, a country can equally be

self-reliant if she borrows resources from outside in order to enhance her productive capacity, a course of action that eventually pays off with ease such debts as she may have contracted from outside due to the resultant increase and reinforcement of her productive capacity. Thus, the problem clearly is not trade or aid per se. The real question at issue then is the terms under which a country engages in foreign trade or borrows from outside and the consequent relations it may engender.³

Consequently, a system which imposes, for instance, an arbitrary international division of labor whereby some countries, usually the weak, colonized and oppressed, are assigned the role of being granaries and suppliers of raw materials, on the one hand, while the other countries, usually the strong and industrialized, assign themselves the responsibility of being suppliers of manufactures and other industrialized products, cannot promote self-reliant development. What is worse, the latter have also usurped the right to set the prices of commodities they produce as well as to determine the prices received by the countries which have been relegated to being the suppliers of primary products. The results of such arrangements have been detrimental to weak and developing countries. They find that they can import less and less with more and more of their hard work increasing exports. Gradually they have discovered that hard work and prosperity were not cause and effect as they had been led to believe by the dominant Euro-American culture. Something external to themselves always seems to break the reputed connection. The so-called neutrality




Fig. 1: Tanzania: the emerging pattern of urbanization.

of the world marketplace turned out to be the neutrality between the exploiter and the exploited, between the bird of prey and its victim. It is a logical consequence of a system which places emphasis on the survival of the strongest as well as buying cheap and selling dear — capitalism.⁴

Similarly, in the case of aid, the problem arises when it is used as an instrument of infiltration and eventually exploitation and domination. Foreign aid has often been used as a means of buying off friends, and especially of stemming the tide for revolution and liberation. Equally disturbing, foreign aid has been used as an instrument for subverting progressive policies which are aimed at consolidating the struggling countries' independence. In addition to all that, foreign aid has often been given at such extortionate terms that the borrowing countries have found themselves paying more than twice what they actually borrowed. Such a situation has actually driven a number of developing countries into unbearable debt burdens, a situation which has in turn been used by the lending countries directly or through the inter-

national institutions which they control to meddle with the policies of the indebted countries. It is not, therefore, uncommon to find nascent progressive countries which have fallen prey to the debt trap being counselled by the pundits of so-called sound financial and economic policy, to abandon some of their progressive policies like subsidized low prices for basic goods which are used by the broad masses as well as abandoning public enterprises to make room for private undertakings in similar activities.

In the case of foreign aid, as in foreign trade, the unequal and degrading system which forces the recipient countries into a submissive and humiliating position is a consequence of a system which props up and elevates the selfish and acquisitive motive in place of egalitarianism and social responsibility.

Thus, in light of the situation imposed by capitalism and imperialism, the Arusha Declaration correctly emphasized that trade and aid under such conditions cannot promote internally generated development and self-reliance. Consequently, by self-reliance, Tanzania, first,




Fig. 2: Tanzania: proposed zones and urban centers for concentrated development.

rejects the arbitrary international division of labor, whereby countries which do not produce cotton become major exporters of cotton textiles while those that produce cotton are forced to a position of being solely dependent on imported cotton textile products. Secondly, Tanzania also rejects foreign aid which weakens rather than stimulates her own efforts and self-reliance. That means she will always carefully and thoroughly examine all the terms and conditions of foreign aid and loans. In fact, Tanzania has never hesitated to reject foreign aid which would have required her to abandon her policy on socialism and self-reliance or the liberation of the oppressed in Southern Africa or elsewhere. For example, Tanzania forfeited a British grant of £7.5 million in 1965 when she severed diplomatic relations with Britain over UDI in Rhodesia. Hence, according to the Arusha Declaration, self-reliance means that the foundation of development in Tanzania must be people, hard work and agriculture. In other words, in order to industrialize, for instance, the requisite machinery, equipment, technology and capital for development of infrastructure must initially be obtained from outside.

However, whether such capital goods are obtained by trade or aid, there is no substitute for hard work by Tanzanians in order to make agriculture more productive so as to pay for the requisite capital goods from abroad. Thus, in evaluating whether or not a country is effectively implementing self-reliance, the question should not so much be that of how much resources the country is receiving from outside, but rather on what terms, and how those resources are used and for whose benefit. In other words, are the resources from outside becoming a substitute for the necessary domestic effort, mobilization and restructuring of the economy which cannot be postponed in the interest of genuine self-reliant and internally based development? (see table 1).

Thus, as can be seen from the figures in table 1, the size of the development plan has increased over five times from the first to the third Five Year Development Plans. In terms of allocation of resources to directly productive activities, economic infrastructure, the comparative picture for the three plans which emerges is as shown in table 2.

In the case of government development finances, namely, excluding resources originating directly from public enterprises, the picture is slightly different for the Third Five Year Development Plan.

The higher level of external financing is a reflection of expanding development requirements, necessitating investments in large scale projects like iron and steel, hydroelectricity, textiles, cement and pulp and paper factories, including their basic infrastructure which require large amounts of domestic as well as foreign exchange resources. Ironically, it is these types of projects, incorporated in the Third Five Year Plan, that may be expected to lay a firm foundation for locally based and self-reliance development. That means that, for a country like Tanzania, there is a stage in the initial and genuine development process at which there is greater reliance on external financing in order to become less dependent on such resources in future.⁵

Since Tanzania cannot now pay for imports of machinery, equipment and technology wholly from her own resources, when taking delivery it has to get these development requirements gratis or on deferred payments (loans) in the genuine and reasonable expectation that when the time for making payments comes, her productive capacity will have increased to such an extent that she will be able to reduce the debt burdens. The problem thus reduces itself to that of prudent and sound financial management.

Table 1

	Tanzania development expenditure (in million shillings) (£ 1 = 17 Tz shillings)		
	Public	Private	Total
First Five Year Plan (1964-69)	2,600	2,320	4,920
Directly productive	860	1,000	1,860
Economic infrastructure	880	660	1,540
Social infrastructure	860	660	1,520
Financing: domestic	840	1,520	2,340
external	2,160	400	2,560
Second Five Year Plan (1969-74)	5,935	2,150	8,085
Directly productive	1,634	1,275	2,909
Economic infrastructure	3,465	275	3,740
Social infrastructure	836	600	1,436
Financing: domestic	3,561	982	4,543
external	2,374	1,168	3,542
Third Five Year Plan (1976-81)	26,974	—	26,978
Directly productive	12,421	—	12,498
Economic infrastructure	8,287	—	8,288
Social infrastructure	6,268	—	6,192
Financing: domestic	13,729	—	13,725
external	13,245	—	13,249

Source: K.A. Malima, *Planning for Self-Reliance, Tanzania Third Five Year Development Plan* (University of Dar-es-Salaam, 1979), p 12.

Table 2
Comparative figures of three Five Year Plans

Sector	First Plan	Second Plan	Third Plan
Directly productive	38 %	36 %	46 %
Economic infrastructure	31 %	46 %	31 %
Social infrastructure	31 %	18 %	23 %
Domestic finance	shs. 2340million (48 %)	shs. 4,543m (56 %)	shs. 13,105m (51 %)
External finance	shs. 2,560million (52 %)	shs. 3,542m (44 %)	shs. 13,240m (49 %)

Source: Malima, *op. cit.* table 1, pp 13-14.

Urbanization perspective

How far back Tanzania's urban history goes is not clear. Evidence of an urban tradition on the East African coast goes back many centuries. Some settlements are known to have existed before the Christian era, but exact dates are not known. The settlements on the coast were mainly concentrated along the fertile coastal strip south of Mogadishu. They were of two main functional types — fishing villages and market towns. The latter were bigger, more diversified and more stable.

While settlements thrived on the coast the interior remained predominantly rural. It was punctuated with scattered homesteads and hamlets, and was later invaded by Arabs and European traders and explorers.

The genesis of urbanization in Tanzania was the administrative posts and centers that were established by the German colonial rulers after the scramble for Africa in the 1880s. Later, after the Second World War, the British reinforced the existing centers and created some more of their own. These originally administrative centers also became centers of commerce, trade, industry, education, transport, etc. These towns have formed the basic pattern of urbanization that is found today.

Throughout the colonial period, urbanization as a way of life was viewed as unsuitable for the indigenous African people. The towns were thus largely inhabited by aliens — Arabs, Indians and Europeans. The indigenous people were regarded as immigrants who went to towns only to fetch money for dowry and taxes and then returned home to the countryside. The colonial towns therefore remained small.

Urbanization became conspicuous and attracted the attention of authorities after Tanzania became independent in 1961, especially when the restrictions on the movement of indigenous people to towns were removed. There was a tremendous rush to towns as people sought to seize the employment prospects that were offered by the emergence of the new nation, particularly Dar-es-Salaam, the first national capital. So far, the urbanization trends and patterns that emerged in the early years of independence have been maintained and reinforced.

Tanzania, however, is still one of the least urbanized countries in sub-Saharan Africa — only 13 percent of the population is urban versus the average of 19 percent for these countries. But it is more the problem of the rate

in relation to resources that is raising considerable concern, rather than the level of urbanization. While the Tanzanian population (17.5 million in 1978) is growing at 3.2 percent, the urban population growth rate is 8 percent per annum. The rate of growth of the urban population has risen from 6 percent between 1948 and 1957, and 6.3 percent between 1957 and 1967, to 8.0 percent per annum between 1967 and 1978. At this rate urban population will double every 9 to 10 years.

On the other hand, Dar-es-Salaam, the largest city, had an increase of population of 4.9 percent between 1948 and 1957, 7.3 percent between 1957 and 1967 and 9.5 percent per annum between 1967 and 1978. If the current growth rate continues the city will double itself every 8 years. This means that it will have a population of 1 million by 1985 and over 3 million by the turn of the century.

In 1978 there were three towns in excess of 100,000 people and six other towns with a population of between 50,000 and 100,000. These high rates of urban growth are the result of rural-urban migration rather than natural increase. Migration therefore deposits too many people in urban areas, by far exceeding the economic and administrative capacity of the towns to employ, house, educate and administer them.

Apart from the movement from rural to urban areas the process of urbanization also includes changing from agricultural to monetary pursuits and the corresponding changing of behavior patterns and cultural values. The movement to towns and cities is not a new phenomenon restricted to any particular parts of the world, but here there are an alarmingly explosive rate and the resulting staggering scale vis-à-vis available resources. For example, Tanzanian towns and cities are characterized by rapid population growth rates as revealed by the recent census, a deteriorating employment situation, inadequately serviced squatter settlements, inefficient mass transport services and critical shortages of all utilities.

The rapid urbanization in developing countries is occurring ahead of any systematic, full-scale movement towards modernization and without transformation of agricultural and urban employment structure.⁶ There are no decisive changes in agricultural productivity and food above subsistence level as a result of the use of modern agricultural techniques and practices. Most

people in urban areas are employed in the services rather than in manufacturing industry. The explosive population growth rate seems to have followed from the conquest of epidemics and other health hazards. The unprecedented rates of urban growth and high degrees of metropolitan concentration, especially in the capital city, which in most cases is also the economic and industrial center, have constrained accelerated economic and social change in the developing countries. The acute scarcity of available resources is reflected in mass poverty and unemployment, social deprivation and communal tension, slums and squatting, growing deficits in services and infrastructure. The urban government and authorities are simply unable to prevent further deterioration. The towns and cities of the developing world have simply outgrown the resources of the economies they are supposed to expand.

Tanzanian urban development policies

Tanzania had until the late 1960s a patchwork of policies to deal with her growing urban problems. The urban populations have been growing rapidly in the last 20 years or so. Until the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the Tanzanian Government pursued a building and land use control strategy to alleviate the pressure for urban housing, infrastructure and community services. The urban problems that came to the immediate notice and attention of the independent government were housing and unemployment. The building strategy was spearheaded by the National Housing Corporation (NHC) established in 1962 to clear slums and build modern low cost residential houses to meet the needs of the rapidly increasing urban populations. In the first years NHC concentrated on slum and squatter clearance on the periphery of the urban areas, especially in Dar-es-Salaam where between 1964 and 1969 about 70 percent of the 5,705 low-cost houses built were located. During the 5 year period the corporation received some £3.47 million from the Tanzanian Government and an additional £970,000 was raised from the Federal Republic of Germany, which also provided technical assistance in the form of one General Manager and a number of architects for the NHC. The total of £4.44 million was only about 25 percent of the target figure in the plan, most of the shortfall resulting from the failure of the NHC to attract more overseas capital.

To deal with unemployment, and indirectly with squatting, vagrants and loiterers were occasionally rounded up by the police and forcibly repatriated to their rural home areas, or rehabilitated in villages surrounding urban areas.⁷

In the Second Five Year Plan 1969-1974, NHC was expected to provide from 35,000 to 40,000 low and medium cost houses in the range of £300-550 per unit, and for the bottom end of the income scale the NHC and the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development were to develop a program for the annual provision of some 5,000 sites-and-services plots to be equipped with water, drainage and foundations.⁸

During the Third Five Year Plan 1976-1981, the Government is expected to consolidate the construction capacity of NHC and with loans from the Tanzania Housing

Bank the corporation would build 2,300 low cost and 2,000 medium cost houses and another 3,700 houses in Dodoma, the new national capital. In all 8,000 houses will be built.⁹

The Tanzania Government applied in 1973 to the World Bank for an IDA loan of about £15 million for 30,000 serviced plots and 25,000 houses for the upgrading of squatter housing schemes in Dar-es-Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya, Iringa, Morogoro, Tanga and Tabora urban areas covering the period from 1974 to 1981. It was hoped that this project would benefit 40 percent of the country's urban population, estimated at 1.2 million in 1976.¹⁰

The second major approach to urban development throughout the 1960s in Tanzania was the control and allocation of land by the Government. Under a series of acts beginning in 1963, all freehold land was converted to Government leasehold and the previous owners were then obliged to pay rent. Conditions for the use of all urban land were agreed upon by the Urban Planning Division and the Lands Development Services Division. The emphasis in plot allocation and the provision of services were shifted from high and medium income areas to the low income areas. In the second Five Year Plan period the Lands Division, in cooperation with the Surveys and Mapping Division and the Urban Planning Division, has been able to prepare for public allocation of some 6-7,000 plots annually, mostly in low-income, high-density areas. It is the practice in Tanzania to compensate fully the people living in a new urban area that is ripe and laid out for development for the value of their crops and buildings. Only after the area has been compensated and cleared for surveying can it be developed. At this point the funds and the responsibility for the services that must be provided — water, roads, power, sewage, community facilities, etc. — are shared among a number of different government departments, local government authorities and parastatal organizations: layout by the Urban Planning Division; compensation and site clearance by the Lands Division; cadastral survey by the Surveys and Mapping Division; engineering design and construction of various types of roads shared by the Ministry of Works, Town Councils, Lands Division and Urban Planning Division; water by the Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals; power by the Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO); storm drainage by whoever is responsible for roads; refuse collection by town councils; telephones by Tanzania Posts and Telecommunications; secondary and higher education by the Ministry of National Education; hospitals and health centers by the Ministry of Health and housing by the National Housing Corporation, registrar of buildings and Ministry of Works, etc.¹¹

In order to facilitate the allocation and control of land uses and installation of basic infrastructure, a program for the preparation of comprehensive urban master plans and interim land uses was initiated. In 1968 a master plan for the city of Dar-es-Salaam was completed, followed by another for Arusha in 1970. Five more master plans for Morogoro, Tabora, Tanga, Moshi and Mbeya were completed and approved by 1975. To date, more than ten interim land use plans for other towns have been prepared and master plans for Arusha and Dar-es-Salaam revised. As Tanzania does not yet have enough competent and experienced town planners, the master plans

and interim land use plans have been made by foreign experts and consultants, mostly Canadians, Finns and Indians. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Kingdom, Canada, etc. have also given assistance for the training of town planners, etc.

The Arusha Declaration of 1967 proclaimed the primacy of socialist rural development and so new emphases began to appear in Tanzania's urban policy. Resources were devoted to the development of villages and urban development had to be minimized. First, moves were taken in the second plan to decentralize certain central government functions to the regions and districts. It was realized that the development of Tanzania cannot be effected from Dar-es-Salaam; local initiative, local coordination of plans and local democratic control over decisions were found to be necessary. Hence, some administrative and financial responsibilities were decentralized. Secondly, some towns — Tanga, Arusha, Moshi, Mwanza, Mtwara, Mbeya, Morogoro, Dodoma and Tabora — were selected for concentrated urban development over the plan period. It was hoped that these development towns would relieve population pressures on Dar-es-Salaam and the countryside, increase the modernization spin-off, provide less congested urban living, disperse investment opportunities and result in more equitable and efficient economic development.

In 1973 Tanzania made one of the most dramatic urban policy decisions by announcing the move of the national capital from Dar-es-Salaam to Dodoma, 500 km to the west. It was proposed that the transfer would take place gradually over 10 years starting in 1975, at an estimated cost of £186 million. It was hoped that the transfer of the capital would help to stimulate development in the country because of the centrality of the new site and would relieve pressure on Dar-es-Salaam. All this is consistent with the overall policy of village development and administrative decentralization.

Some preliminary activities relating to the building of the new national capital started almost immediately, and the preparation of the capital master plan was completed in 1976. For the master plan preparation and implementation, technical assistance has been received from Canada, Australia, India, Pakistan, Mexico, Italy, Arab Oil Countries and the United Nations. The Tanzanian Government has given Dodoma top priority in the allocation of funds and manpower. Dodoma is the largest single national development project with an estimated expenditure in the Third Five Year Plan period (1976-81) of £180 million. Out of this staggering sum only £10.0 million so far has been obtained as foreign aid.¹²

Performance of policies and aid

Over the last 19 years or so Tanzania has received both multilateral and bilateral aid for direct urban sector projects or urban oriented projects to help achieve her development policies in the fields of urban planning, housing, transport, water supply, powers, building materials research, training, etc. The assistance has come mainly from the Scandinavian countries, Canada, West Germany, World Bank, UNDP, etc. Both capital and technical assistance have been offered.

Both the first and second Five Year Plans expected NHC to play a major role in providing low cost urban

housing. During the 1964-69 period, however, the corporation was able to obtain only about 25 percent of the funds expected from Treasury grants or international and bilateral assistance, and 70 percent of the low cost houses it built in Dar-es-Salaam were part of a slum clearance scheme which added nothing to the existing stock.¹³

In view of other development priorities in rural areas which emphasized the need to develop water, health, and educational facilities, and because of the Treasury's dissatisfaction over NHC failure to keep costs low enough, and the general poor financial controls and rent collection, the funds allocated to NHC diminished considerably over the second plan period. In 1974 it was decided that NHC would no longer receive treasury grants and instead it would have to borrow money from the Tanzania Housing Bank at commercial rates of interest for low income housing of 6 percent. A loan for an individual house had to be £2,000 or less. This amount was not adequate to build a low cost house, and the prospective tenants were not able to pay rent assessed at 14 percent of the construction cost. Therefore, against a targeted figure of 10,000 houses NHC was only able to build less than 5,000 low cost units throughout the country during the entire second Five Year Plan period. The prices of building materials and construction costs escalated and additional funds were not available. Also, building equipment and skilled personnel were short.¹⁴

While the second Five Year Plan called for 5,000 serviced plots per year, only about 1,000 had been made available and all of these were in a single area of Dar-es-Salaam. The standards and costs of infrastructure were just too high, putting the project well beyond the reach of most low income families. It was abandoned and the project handed over to a housing cooperative formed to take advantage of the core houses and with favorable loan terms for building materials to complete the houses. The members of the cooperative are mostly middle and high level civil servants and public employees. Few if any low income families have benefitted.

Some snags have already been observed with regard to the World Bank supported sites and services and squatter upgrading programs in Tanzania. Most of the plots in the sites and services areas have found their way into the hands of medium and high income people, showing that regulations regarding plot allocation only to low income people have not been strictly adhered to. Moreover, the procedures for acquiring plots are long, complicated and costly. Similarly, house loan procedures are cumbersome and expensive. Building plans and permits have to be obtained and paid for. Low income people have simply been put off by the system and resorted to squatting.¹⁵

In the squatter upgrading areas it has proved difficult to survey the plots and establish boundaries so that titles and security of tenure could be granted. Moreover, new squatters continue to immigrate into upgraded areas. The residents have found it difficult to obtain loans for upgrading their houses and businesses without valid titles to the land. It has also been found that facilities that have been installed in upgraded areas are not maintained, especially the water kiosks. Roads, too, have fallen out of repair as local authorities do not have funds for maintenance. It was expected that much of the work

of constructing and maintaining community facilities would be carried out through mutual or self-help. This arrangement has not proved very effective in urban areas. Many people have failed to meet conditions set by the Tanzania Housing Bank and are considered high credit risks.¹⁶

Although at the time of appraisal it was expected that 40 percent of the Tanzanian urban population would benefit from the sites and services and squatter upgrading program, it was not realized that the urban and particularly squatter population was increasing at such a very high rate. According to the 1978 census Tanzania has an urban population of 2.5 million and, by the time the project is completed in 1981, the urban population will have risen to approximately 3.0 million. Therefore, in reality, and assuming successful implementation, the project would probably affect only 16 percent of the urban population and 40 percent of the squatter population of about 1.2 million. Of course, the IDA assistance is merely demonstrative and not substantive. It is unlikely that IDA assistance will be continued after 1981 on a large scale. At the moment there are negotiations for IDA assistance for the development of Morogoro, whose population is expected to double in the next five years as a result of concentrated industrial development. Tanzania left on her own cannot afford to carry on or replicate the IDA style solution for the lowest income groups in urban areas on a large and wide scale.¹⁷

In the early 1960s, the German Government had provided capital and technical assistance for the NHC Urban Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Program and the result was the destruction of about 1,400 houses, containing more than 5,000 dwelling units and 20,000 people. Perhaps the Germans found out that housing was a "bottomless pit." Anyway, they backed out.

The Norwegians have concentrated their attention on research for new building materials and construction techniques for both urban and rural housing. They have also engaged in the promotion of urban cooperative housing, especially employment-based housing co-operatives. They built and equipped the National Building Research Centre and provided personnel. The Norwegians have now handed over the center to the Tanzanian Government, but there are very few competent and experienced Tanzanian engineers and architects to run the center and produce useful results.

The Tanzanian Government is currently spending £1 million annually on the housing sector and it is unlikely that this amount will be increased without distorting other priority expenditures. Despite all the local and international efforts the housing situation is getting worse. Squatter areas are proliferating. NHC has been unable to build truly low-cost houses. The Building Research Centre has not produced local designs and building materials that are really suitable and cheap. Few genuine housing cooperatives have been established in the towns. The Tanzania Housing Bank has not been of any use for the urban poor. The IDA site and services and squatter upgrading program has had limited effect. Generally the external assistance for the housing sector has been minimal in comparison with the magnitude of the problem. The immigrant population has resorted to shack living on the unimproved periphery of urban areas.

The Lands and the Urban Planning Division's land use controls and master plan schemes have been beset by a lot of problems. The Lands Division annual allocation was not adequate to meet the national demands for plots, and for Dar-es-Salaam alone the waiting list for high density plots stood at 15,000 by the end of 1972. In spite of the high-level pressure to provide and speed up the allocation, the procedure remained slow and expensive.

In addition to the paucity of funds for compensation purposes, Tanzania is critically short of qualified and experienced surveyors, valuers, town planners and urban managers. In fact, more than 50 percent of the approved posts in government organizations for these professions are vacant. Moreover, surveyors, in particular, require imported and expensive equipment and materials to execute their work satisfactorily. There are a few German, Danish, Dutch, etc. surveyors, town planners, architects, engineers, etc. who are assisting on a voluntary basis. The courage of these people to go out and help must be appreciated, but they have little experience and are too few.

When the town councils were abolished in 1974 and absorbed into the district and regional directorates, the responsibility for the allocation of plots was not clearly defined. Multitudes of government and party officials, ranging from junior to top executives and politicians, came to be involved in the illegal allocation of plots. Even open spaces, road reserves, sites reserved for schools, dispensaries, etc. came to be allocated to influential and powerful individuals by all sorts of devices including corrupt means.

It was expected that the successful implementation of the 1968 Dar-es-Salaam and other master plans would depend to a large extent on the degree of control exercised over squatting and construction of basic infrastructure. As the building, sites and services and plot allocation programs have fallen far short of provision for the net migration to the towns and cities (estimated at 50,000 per annum for Dar-es-Salaam city), squatting offers a necessary and rational response to the accommodation problem. In Dar-es-Salaam a 1978 study revealed that 60 percent of the population lives in squatter areas.¹⁸ It is, therefore, politically impossible to remove the major squatting areas in Tanzania, and to improve them by putting in roads, water and drainage is a laborious and costly exercise.

Expert estimates indicate that, if Tanzania is to liquidate the current squatter problem, it has to spend £6.0 million annually for the next five years. In the last ten years Tanzania has made minimal resource allocations for urban infrastructure because the government policies have stressed rural development. The urban areas have been virtually neglected. This naturally has resulted in inadequate provision and maintenance of urban infrastructure. There was a tendency to promote rural development against urban development, especially among politicians. This was unrealistic as rural and urban areas are complementary to each other. The false assumption was probably that urban development would automatically follow as a consequence of investment in rural areas. The exclusively rural approach to development must be changed, and in fact this has now been realized and emphasis in the third Five Year Plan is on industrial de-

velopment, which implicitly means urban development. Urban infrastructure is prerequisite to the efficient functioning of towns as productive centers.

Apart from the lack of financial resources, the other problem which faced the provision of urban infrastructure was the lack of coordination among the different agencies responsible for implementation of various items of infrastructure, which, in 1973, numbered at least 12. The result was a large waste of time and effort in getting the various bodies to work in unison. It was impossible to program and control projects. There was no unified budgeting or legal power to coordinate the implementation of the programs of these more or less independent agencies. This resulted in long delays and the provision of new housing areas without roads or water.

It is estimated that in the last twenty years the government and city council have spent £71 million on urban infrastructure in Dar-es-Salaam.¹⁹ Out of this total £50 million consisted of foreign loans, mainly Canadian, German and World Bank. Most of these loans have now been written off and converted into grants.

It is estimated that, if current standards of living of Dar-es-Salaam city's residents are to be maintained, let alone improved, £50.0 million must be spent on the improvement of its infrastructure in the next five years, or 3 percent annually of the 1979/80 national development budget. Tanzania, one of the poorest countries in the world, has absolutely no capacity to cope with this enormous problem. The city residents, with a per capita income of £400 (1978), are also not able to contribute significantly to city infrastructure development. In any case the city government is very weak. It has no adequate finance to meet even its current budget. There is only a handful of competent managerial and technical staff. It badly needs capital and technical assistance just to keep the city functioning.

The Canadians (CIDA) have given technical assistance for the preparation of the Dar-es-Salaam, Arusha and Dodoma master plans while the Finns have likewise prepared master plans for Moshi, Tanga, Tabora and Mbeya. UNDP provided technical assistance for the preparation of a model regional plan for the Dar-es-Salaam sub-region, and, in addition, they have played a key role in the training of the town planners and building designers at Ardhi Institute in Dar-es-Salaam by providing teaching personnel and equipment. The Danes (DANIDA) have given and continue to give substantial capital and technical assistance to Ardhi Institute which, in addition to town planners and designers, trains surveyors, valuers and quantity surveyors. The Institute graduates are expected to play a leading role in the implementation of the national land development program. However, if there are no capital and technical advisers for development of basic infrastructure, they will not have much to do.

The Germans have recently assisted with the construction of two major arterial roads in Dar-es-Salaam — the roads to the airport and port — to improve the functional efficiency of the city as a transport center. The World Bank has assisted with the expansion and improvement of the Dar-es-Salaam port to facilitate export and import trade. Also, the Germans along with the Canadians have played major roles in the provision of the water supply for the Dar-es-Salaam city. The city now has adequate water supply to last until 1990. The Germans have as-

sisted too in the development of the water supply for Tanga and Tabora. There are also projects in progress to increase the supply of water in other towns, for example, Mwanza, Iringa, Shinyanga, Mtwara, Lindi, Arusha, Dodoma and Mbeya. Generally, the situation of water supply in most towns seems to be rather satisfactory, but the actual distribution of water in the towns leaves much to be desired. The basic premise for the allocation of large amounts of capital to the provision of water supply by Tanzania is that water brings immense benefits to public health and economic development. Since the investment in water has been given high priority, it has attracted a considerable amount of aid funds. When the water reaches the towns it is supplied mostly to a small proportion of the population, the wealthiest sector — the middle and high income groups who pay very low water rates. These are not high enough to cover even the running and maintenance costs.²⁰ The squatters get very little of the water. At present Tanzania is in a situation where investment is heavily committed to bringing high standards of supply to a few, while the needs of the many are left unfulfilled — the influx population into the urban areas.

The power sector has also received considerable aid from international and bilateral agencies. The Kidatu HEP scheme, which was developed with the assistance of the World Bank and other bilateral agencies, supplies more than 50 percent (100 MW) of the present Tanzanian electric power requirements. The Germans and Danes have given and continue to give assistance for the installation of electricity in 13 district towns and 10 villages. There are problems with the provision of electricity for regional towns, as the cost of oil and diesel continues to rise. Tanzania, however, is making concerted efforts to rely more on her own HEP resources in the eastern, northern and north-western areas of the country. Power projects are capital-intensive, and Tanzania will have to rely heavily on external assistance to realize her objective of self-sufficiency in electricity requirements. Again, electricity is considered of basic importance in economic development, especially for industrial and mineral development and domestic use. However, the low income or squatter areas normally don't get electricity. For example, in Dar-es-Salaam more than 70 percent of the households have no electricity. It is, therefore, impossible to establish small scale industries in squatter areas to help with the solution of the unemployment problem.

Generally, international agencies have not shown strong interest in urban infrastructure, probably because of the Tanzanian policies, and the share of aid allocated to urban areas has been too small to keep pace with the needs generated by the rapid population growth of the order of 8-9 percent per annum. Urban roads and transport, sanitation and drainage have attracted little or no assistance. With the recent outbreaks of cholera and typhoid in several major towns, the World Bank is undertaking a study of the sanitation problem in Dar-es-Salaam and other towns. While further studies are being made for the supply of water and electricity, the problems of distribution and breakdowns have yet to be attended to. It is common for houses, factories, institutions, etc. to go without water or electricity for days in Dar-es-Salaam, Dodoma, Tabora, Shinyanga, etc. Although the supply seems to be adequate, maintenance is poor because of

lack of spare parts and technicians.

The construction of an urban infrastructural system is very costly, and Tanzania will need more capital and technical assistance — much more than ever before — as it is embarking on its new development strategy that places heavy emphasis on basic industries.

Tanzania has made efforts to decentralize central government, to initiate the urban growth pole policy and to move the capital to Dodoma in order to reduce the costs of providing infrastructure for Dar-es-Salaam city and to promote rural development. Evidence available so far indicates that, despite all efforts to control the growth of Dar-es-Salaam, the city has more than doubled its population since 1967 and consequently remains the chief source of urban problems (see table 3). Three main reasons could be cited for the ineffectiveness of the industrial decentralization policy during the second plan period.²¹ First, in many cases the location decisions were made before the start of the plan. Secondly, no government agency was given formal and direct responsibility for implementing the policy. Consequently, industries continued to be located generally according to management demands and economic efficiency, rather than equity considerations. Thirdly, many of the towns designated as growth poles do not have high enough levels of urban infrastructure to sustain major industries. Tanzania simply did not have resources of her own to promote a balanced urbanization and industrial location policy. The master plans prepared for the growth pole towns are merely grand designs, and few if any of their recommended capital works projects have been implemented since their completion and approval in 1975. Of course, they are still used as reference material for occasional local land use controls.

On the announcement of the decision to move the national capital to Dodoma, some preliminary activities relating to the building of the capital started almost immediately, and work on the preparation of the Capital Master Plan was completed in 1976 by the Canadians. So far, it is reported that some civil engineering works for water supply, sewerage system, transport facilities, construction materials, etc. have been undertaken. In view of the dry nature of the area, environmental investigations, landscaping and tree planting have been initiated. About 630 residential houses have been built and 10 percent of the party and government employees have been transferred from Dar-es-Salaam.

Table 3
Growth of the population of Dar-es-Salaam.

Year	Tanzania mainland (1000)	Dar-es-Salaam population (1000)	Dar-es-Salaam population % of total pop.
1948	7,480	69	0.92
1957	8,789	129	1.47
1967	11,608	316	2.72
1978	17,281	738	4.27

Source: *Draft Dar-es-Salaam Master Plan: Population and Economic Profile*, 1979, p. 4.

It was expected that by the end of the third year plan in 1981 about 40 percent of the government ministries and departments would have been transferred from Dar-es-Salaam, and the population would grow from 60,000 in 1976 to 144,000. However, the 1978 census indicates that Dodoma had only 45,600 people. The actual construction of infrastructure and government offices is still in the initial stages. Many projects are still in the design stage, despite allocation of considerable financial and manpower resources by the government. From 1973 to 1979 a total of £30.0 million has been spent on the building of the new national capital. In the last six years a sizeable amount of bilateral and multilateral technical aid has gone to Dodoma. UNDP gave 20 experts whose services were valued at £2 million, Mexico 20 experts at the value of £1.0 million, Australia £0.2 million, Pakistan and India together £1.0 million — all in terms of personnel. All these experts have experience in the construction of new capitals, but experts from different countries do not always agree on ways of doing things and get involved in arguments and hence delays. The progress being made does not look satisfactory. The government and the party have expressed concern about the pace of development, and the public is increasingly skeptical about the idea and merits of a new capital in Dodoma. It does not look reasonable in these difficult economic times, characterized by general world economic recession and rising energy costs, compounded by the flood and drought disasters that have hit Tanzania in recent years. If the cost of the Tanzania/Uganda war (estimated at £288.0 million) is added, a very bleak situation emerges. Unless Tanzania gets urgent aid, it might be wise to suspend the move of the capital until such time as the economy recovers.

It is expected that, when industrial infrastructure becomes more established in Tanzania, the government's policy on industrial decentralization will result in a slowdown in net immigration to Dar-es-Salaam and the reinforcement of other regional/district towns. However, it may be some time before the positive effects of this policy will appreciably slow the rate of net-migration to Dar-es-Salaam.

It is sometimes argued that the many man years and months of technical assistance expended, and the Tanzania counterpart effort and support to technical experts, etc., have been less productive than might be.²² For example, if master plan studies are not directly related to the financial and administrative implementation capacity of Tanzania, then the plans have little relevance. The urban and regional plans have been found to be too expensive to implement and lay a heavy financial burden upon national and local authorities. The plans have many inherent shortcomings. While they may appear perfectly reasonable to the experts and consultants who have prepared them, local authorities and agencies often find them incomprehensible and unacceptable. There are a number of problems with experts. First, expatriates spend such a short time in Tanzania that their actual understanding and interpretation of national policies and local conditions is not usually well developed, because of language and other cultural barriers. Secondly, expatriates originating from developed countries tend to impose solutions that have been adopted or tried in their

home countries without much regard for the prevailing local conditions. Besides, many of them are just too young and perhaps have little practical experience even in their own countries, because sometimes they propose solutions that have been discarded at home. Thirdly, many experts leave soon after completing the preparations of the plans, and leave the implementation and monitoring of the plans to other newly arrived experts or to local people who either have little experience themselves or were never actually involved actively in the preparation of the plans. These people may, therefore, not be fully aware of the concept and overall logic of the respective plans. They cannot explain the bases on which priorities were set and the proposals for the action program and projects made. They are simply unable to defend the plans before national authorities responsible for the allocation of funds and manpower.

The present rigid contractual periods of two years are too short. The contracts should preferably be flexible enough to last the whole duration of plan preparation and implementation of the five year capital works program. Expatriates need familiarization with local conditions such as the political and the ideological system, cultural values, economic, social and climatic conditions, planning and construction techniques and standards. Such familiarization requires time and possibly changes of attitudes. Perhaps it would be a good idea to introduce compulsory orientation courses for expatriate planners.

In Tanzania, as perhaps elsewhere, the role of expatriates is to man those jobs where nationals are not yet available and to give national counterparts on-the-job training during the execution of a technical assistance project so that they can effectively take over on the departure of the expatriates. Experience in Tanzania has, however, shown that in most cases expatriates rarely perform their intended double role effectively. As "gap fillers," their output is not fully exploited due to time constraint, and as "trainers" expatriates do not possess basic guidelines on how to train, and in many cases counterparts are not assigned. For example, the UNDP support for the Ardhi Institute planning course was initially scheduled to last for three years starting in 1973. After nearly six years Ardhi Institute still cannot do without UNDP assistance. The local planning teachers are not enough to take over because few counterparts have been trained. Both funds for fellowships and suitable candidates were not available. It was only in the last two years that two counterparts have been sent for advanced studies.

Again, the sophisticated, Canadian-financed Dar-es-Salaam water supply project, commissioned in 1976, has to date few if any competent local technicians to operate and maintain the machinery at the intake. Every time there is a major breakdown, technicians and spare parts have to be flown from Canada. This is because there was no proper arrangement for the Canadian consultants who installed the system to train local people or for CIDA to send them abroad so that on return they could effectively run the system. Many other similar instances could be quoted.

Over the last 15 years or so Tanzania has been training planners overseas in the United Kingdom, Canada, USA,

Australia, etc. under technical assistance programs of the respective countries. Although the courses dealt with urbanization, they were not directly related to the specific and special problems of Tanzania. These graduates have learnt to deal with situations that have little relevance to their responsibilities at home, except for a few specialized courses like the one run by DPU and a few other places. These overseas training programs are expensive and their output is low in relation to the needs of Tanzania. To date these courses have produced only 15 graduate planners, while Tanzania has over 100 established posts for planners in government organizations. 60 percent of which still remain vacant, the rest being occupied by the few available local planners and expatriates. Tanzania at present requires 200 planners to handle the planning tasks in urban areas and villages.²³

On the other hand, the UNDP-sponsored town planning diploma course at Ardhi Institute has produced 70 assistant town planners since it was launched in 1972. The course is practically oriented towards the actual Tanzanian urban and village planning problems with emphasis on village planning, urban design and master planning in the first, second and third years respectively.²⁴ These "Diplomates" have been found to be extremely competent and are very much sought after. Immediately after graduation they have been assigned responsible jobs in the regional and local town planning departments. The Tanzanian overseas town planning graduates usually need time for orientation to understand and relate their high sounding theories to local planning circumstances and realities. For example, many of them have no idea of how to make a village plan or a squatter improvement plan, whereas they might be able to produce an elaborate design for a recreation area or a city center redevelopment plan. It is therefore, definitely advantageous to conduct planning courses locally, and the planners can later be sent overseas for short courses to broaden their outlook.

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing discussion and observations, it is strongly recommended that international and bilateral aid for Tanzanian urban development should be directed and focused on these central themes, and that aid agencies should:

1. Assist in the formulation of a comprehensive national urban development strategy and policy in view of the scale and complexity of the problems involved.
2. Pay particular attention to the possibility of setting up individual capital development projects for particular cities with a broader framework of intersectoral coordination.
3. Carry out investigations into the ways of reorganizing local governments, as more efficient implementation depends on the organizational, managerial and technical capability of urban governments or other implementing agencies.
4. Pay more attention to the financing of urban infrastructural development by examining possibilities for modifications to the local fiscal systems.

5. Continue and intensify concentration on the three basic sectors of housing, transport and water supply/sewage, and critically review technical standards and capital costs in cities of differing sizes and with different economic bases.
6. Assist with the design and establishment of local urban data systems as a basis for decision-making.

Conclusion

What generally emerges from the participation of aid agencies in the development of the urban sector in Tanzania is that assistance was not given within a specific and comprehensive urban strategy with clearly defined priorities and goals. Instead, their contribution has been almost ad hoc in character, with each project viewed as a separate element within a total package of development aid delivered to Tanzania. Involvement has not been directed towards a conscious effort to evolve a co-ordinated urban approach which is interrelated with other development sectors such as agriculture, industry, education, etc. The total urban effort has been sporadic and meager in relation to the scale of the growing urban problem and dispersed thinly over many small projects.

On the other hand, Tanzania has had no clear urban development strategy or policy. The prevailing attitude towards urban development in Tanzania has always been negative. Tanzania's overriding objective in the last 12 years has been socialist rural development. The urban areas have been thought of as exploiting rural areas because they benefited most from government expenditures, while the rural areas generated the foreign exchange used for the repayment of foreign loans that have been used for building urban infrastructure.

The low priority given to urban areas in the past is no longer justifiable in view of the increasingly growing significance of towns as production and population centers. For example, Dar-es-Salaam in 1978 generated 20 per cent of the GDP of Tanzania. It is complementarity, not

dichotomy, that is universally accepted as existing between rural and urban areas.

In general, there has been more innovation in Tanzania in terms of the large number of decisions taken in the last two decades to alter the distribution of benefits to major groups within both urban and rural areas. Policy innovation, however, is not of much use in the absence of effective implementation.²⁵ While Tanzania has pushed very hard to draw out the urban policy implications of an ideology which stresses rural socialist development, it has paid less attention to strengthening the machinery necessary to carry out the new policies. The resultant urban programs are very costly and performance has bogged down because of commitment to rural development and inadequate resources. However, if a country is poor and its technical and managerial resources are limited, to put too much pressure on bureaucracy to effect change is to invite stagnation.²⁶ Unless performance is improved, this is a danger that always lurks behind policy innovation in Tanzania.

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Emergency, temporary and permanent housing after disasters in developing countries

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For several decades now, a number of professionals in disaster relief and housing-related agencies have used a three category classification — emergency, temporary, and permanent — to define different stages in the reconstruction of low-income housing after disasters in developing countries. The widespread use of these three categories, essentially a polarization between provisional and permanent housing, was partly generated by changes in the construction sector in many countries with the introduction of sophisticated technological innovations and lifestyles produced in the developed countries that increased disparities in housing for different social groups; by an increase in urban migration that resulted in accelerated urbanization,¹ land speculation and serious shortages of available housing; by the adop-

tion in many countries of unrealistically ambitious standards for building codes for housing in general, as well as for government-supported housing programs that resulted both in costly shelter and low-income shelter that filtered upward to middle-income groups; and by the upsurge of a number of international, bilateral, and voluntary disaster relief agencies, one of whose functions was the provision of housing, and who generated their own philosophies of housing relief and reconstruction.²

The categories of emergency, temporary, and permanent housing, used not only for postdisaster shelter but also for shelter under standard conditions, are in many cases a device to legitimize a lack of government regulation of the housing sector, to provide visibility to the agencies' activities, and to disguise a lack of government programs to prevent the serious decay of the physical and environmental conditions of human settlements. Consistent with the general deterioration of the low-income housing sector in developing countries, a rapid