

School Expansion in Tanzania: Private Initiatives and Public Policy

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In much of Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, education is the most prominent public policy arena. A large percentage of the population, a substantial portion of the annual national budget, and a good deal of the foreign assistance are all involved in education. Education policy is necessarily very political in its effect and therefore in its specification. This most prominent of public policies, however, has distinctly private dimensions.

The importance of schooling is in part a legacy of European rule. Racially segregated education was an especially visible feature of European administration. Notwithstanding its ostensibly meritocratic form, its critical role in the maintenance of European control was widely understood. From the European perspective, schools trained a small African elite for administrative and service roles in the colonized polity. Equally important, the schools socialized (more or less effectively) that elite into European values, customs, and patterns of daily life. For Africans, schools were the primary route to a more secure life, to relative affluence and influence, and to the benefits afforded by the colonial situation.¹ Hence expanded access to education was both a central demand of the citizenry and a promise of the new leadership at the end of European rule.

As well, schools are important because they are the site of one of the most important social allocations: access (or, rather, a chance at access) to positions of power, wealth, status, prestige, and security. Especially where there are strong national efforts to reduce the significance of ethnicity, region, religion, race, and gender as important and politically salient differentiators within the population, schooling becomes not only the primary but often, at least officially, the sole selection criterion for further education and/or employment.

Earlier versions of some of the findings reported here were presented at the 1984 annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, in "Expansion of Access to Education—What Forms, Whose Benefit, and Why?" and at the Thirteenth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, in "Public Allocation and Private Influence in Tanzania." Field research for this study was supported by a Fulbright Senior Scholar Research Award and by the Rockefeller Foundation through a collaborative project with the University of Dar es Salaam.

¹ For an overview and references, see Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly, eds., *Education and the Colonial Experience*, 2d rev. ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1984).

Comparative Education Review, vol. 31, no. 3.

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0010-4086/87/3103-0002\$01.00

The promise of, and demand for, more schools were reinforced by the human-resource orientation that dominated educational planning in the initial years of independence. It was widely assumed that the shortage of higher-level skills was a major barrier to development (however defined). In a situation of scarce resources and of almost unbounded optimism about what the schools could achieve, the formal educational system was to be the major vehicle for overcoming the skills constraint and for imbuing the populace with the ideas and values deemed consonant with, and necessary for, development and national unity.²

That promise and demand were also reinforced by a strong concern for the fragility of postcolonial political institutions. New leaders needed to provide visible and rapid benefits to the populace. Although they might lack trained teachers, curriculum materials, and even stationery, there could be new schools nearly everywhere in a relatively short period, especially where local communities were willing to donate materials and labor. Even the most rural areas could thus see the fruits of the new order. Providing clean water, or rural medical facilities, or paved roads, or electrification, or functioning agricultural extension centers, was likely to take much longer. Hence rapid expansion of schooling was commonly understood by both the leaders and the mass public as a central element in the legitimization of the new government and of the structure of the state itself.

Widespread demand for expanded access to schools, urgent human-power needs, and the perceived fragility of the national government combined to produce a technocratic orientation toward the management of the education sector. Educational development is expected to be planned, to be organized rationally, and to be guided by expertise to maximize the effect of scarce resources. That is, although the origins of the pressure for expanded access to education are in large part political, the achievement of that expansion is expected to be apolitical. Educational planners, not party officials, are assigned the dominant roles in implementing the expansion policy. Even though it is clear to everyone involved that the decisions made (e.g., where to locate new schools and thus who will be advantaged in the access to education) have major political consequences, it is assumed that those decisions can, and should, be based on criteria that are removed from politics.

For the same reasons, the education sector is expected to be highly centralized both to emphasize the technocratic character of educational expansion and to counter potentially disintegrative strong local demands and opposition to national policy. Even where national leaders stress the

² This orientation is nicely captured in Idrian Resnick, ed., *Tanzania: Revolution by Education* (Arusha: Longman, 1968).

integration of schools into their local communities, curriculum, textbooks and other materials, major examinations, and teacher selection, training, and promotion are all to be set nationally.

In short, in much of Africa as well as elsewhere in the Third World (at least for the immediate term), education is the primary public policy. After a very politicized gestation and birth, the expansion of schooling is to be depoliticized. Relevant experts are to organize human and other resources rationally and to make decisions on the basis of technical criteria. While local communities are expected to construct facilities, schooling is to be national in character. The rapidly expanded educational sector is to develop skills, instill appropriate attitudes, and reinforce legitimacy. As we shall see, in practice allocations in education are often at least as much private as public and at least as much political as technical-rational.

Expanded Access to Schooling

Almost everywhere in Africa, many new schools were opened. Just as limited access to education had earlier symbolized European rule, expanded access came to symbolize the achievements of the new order. In many countries, the human-resource rationale for expanded access to education was superseded by the assertion of education as a basic human right: "Basic literacy and numeracy liberate the human personality, and are thus valuable in their own right quite apart from the contribution that literacy and numeracy make to the nation's economy and to the individual's economic situation. . . . Education is the right of all citizens."³ Despite resource constraints, by the second decade of independence several countries could offer primary education to all, or nearly all, their children.

To understand more fully the trajectory of that expansion, it is useful to review the experience in one country, Tanzania. As educational development there is reviewed, one can examine more systematically the mix of public and private decision making that has emerged and can explore some of the consequences of that mix.

Tanzania provides an especially informative case to study. Its leadership has articulated its educational and human-resource-development philosophy, including a strong commitment to planned educational expansion. Since independence in 1961, there have been both expanded access to education and extensive reforms of the content and orientation of schooling.⁴ There has also been an effort to control who gets access to expanded,

³ Julius K. Nyerere, "Education in Tanzania," *Harvard Educational Review* 55, no. 1 (February 1985): 45, 52.

⁴ It is beyond the scope of this paper to review that entire history here. For overviews and commentaries in a relatively rich literature, see H. Hinzen and V. H. Hunsdorfer, eds., *The Tanzanian Experience: Education for Liberation and Development* (Hamburg: Evans, 1979); Brian Cooksey and Abel Ishumi, *A Critical Review of Policy and Practice in Tanzanian Secondary Education since 1967* (Dar es

but still limited, schooling. My concern here is to report on expansion at the primary level in the 1960s and at the secondary level in the 1980s.⁵

It is clear that throughout this process of expansion there is a continuing tension between the pressure for more schools on the one hand and efforts to reduce inequality on the other. There is a continuing tension between central direction and local autonomy as well. In the context of those tensions, notwithstanding the firm assertion of centrally directed planned development, there continues to be a major role in expansion—and, thus, in educational policy, planning, and management more broadly—for private initiatives and agencies, especially the churches.

More Primary Schools

In the first decade of Tanzania's independence, educational expansion had different meanings for citizens and leaders. The popular pressure was for access to primary schools, which, in the earlier era, held the promise of upward social mobility. In the human-resource orientation of the national leadership, however, the critical educational task was to develop high-level skills. Primary school expansion would come later. Hence, although many new schools were opened and the enrollment increased rapidly, after an initial spurt, school expansion roughly matched the growth of the population.⁶ Consequently, by 1973 still fewer than half of the primary-school-aged children could be accommodated.⁷

During European rule, schools were not spread evenly across the countryside. Most were located where missionaries were active and where

Salaam, 1986); Karim F. Hirji, "School Education and Underdevelopment in Tanzania," *Maji-Maji* 12 (1973): 1–22; Kenneth King, *The End of Education for Self-Reliance?* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, Centre of African Studies, 1983); David R. Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian Case* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976); Pius Msekwa and T. L. Maliyamkono, *The Experiments: Education Policy Formation before and after the Arusha Declaration* (Dar es Salaam: Black Star, 1979); I. M. Omari et al., *Universal Primary Education in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam and International Development Research Centre, 1983); and "Schooling and Socialism: Educational Reform in Tanzania," *Geneve-Afrique* 21, no. 1 (1983): 55–72; and James R. Sheffield, "Basic Education for the Rural Poor: The Tanzanian Case," *Journal of Developing Areas* 14 (October 1979): 99–110.

⁵ This paper draws on the numerous studies available and on my own research in Tanzania in 1968–69, 1974, 1983, and 1984 as well as on the work of others associated with the research project, "Revolution by Education in Tanzania: A Reexamination" (codirected with Suleman Sumra).

⁶ Unfortunately, Tanzanian educational statistics are inconsistent (a problem, of course, not unique to Tanzania). As well, data on schools and enrollments in Tanzania frequently pertain only to government (or government-assisted) schools and their students. The data presented in this paper are drawn from an extensive review of Tanzanian educational statistics; less reliable data have been excluded.

⁷ See Julius K. Nyerere, "To Plan Is to Choose," speech presented to TANU Conference, Dar es Salaam, May 28, 1969, reprinted in United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969–30th June, 1974*, vol. 1 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 11; and TANU National Executive Committee, "Directive on the Implementation of 'Education for Self-Reliance,'" the Musoma Resolution (Dar es Salaam, 1974), reprinted in *African Review* 6, no. 1 (1976): 106.

Europeans settled, especially in the highlands of the north, northwest, and southwest. Consequently, at independence residential location was already a source of wide, and widely noted, inequality in access to education. To address inherited regional inequalities, educational authorities sought to restrain school expansion in the areas with the most extensive school network and to use available funds to construct new schools elsewhere.

Such redistribution policies are rarely welcomed by those whose advantages are being challenged. Since the regions with more schools were also those that produced relatively high-value export crops, their residents regarded the equalization policy as a substantial transfer of the wealth they generated. Unwilling to be held back in an arena as critical as education, citizens in those regions seized the initiative. Kilimanjaro provides a useful case in point.⁸

Kilimanjaro: Primary-School Expansion

In the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Education⁹ sought to slow school expansion in the advantaged areas and for several years rejected requests to open new primary classes and schools in Kilimanjaro. Yet local people proceeded to open new schools without official authorization or assistance.¹⁰ Often the community church (in Kilimanjaro either Roman Catholic or Lutheran) played a central role in that process by, for example, organizing local citizens to donate labor and materials for classroom construction, providing financial assistance, and securing teachers and supplies. At the outset, such schools operated in substandard buildings, were poorly equipped, and had a teaching staff whose own education had not gone much beyond that of their students. The demand for education, however, was intense. Despite the obvious deficiencies of the unofficial schools and their marginal legal status, there were always more applicants than available places. By the late 1960s, although expansion of government primary schools had been slowed, private primary schooling had increased so rapidly that there were nearly as many pupils in unregistered as in registered schools.

When the Ministry of Education did authorize primary school expansion in Kilimanjaro, what occurred was the voluntary nationalization of some of the private schools. After all, the local people argued, why build new

⁸ Kilimanjaro refers here to the area immediately around Mt. Kilimanjaro, including Moshi town. What earlier was Kilimanjaro District has now become Hai District, Moshi Rural District, Moshi Urban District, and Rombo District. Kilimanjaro Region includes those districts as well what was formerly Pare District, now Mwanga District and Same District.

⁹ In 1984 the ministry responsible for education became (again) the Ministry of Education, the designation used here for the entire period under discussion.

¹⁰ For a fuller discussion of Kilimanjaro primary-school expansion, see Joel Samoff, *Tanzania: Local Politics and the Structure of Power* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), chap. 2, and "Education in Tanzania: Class Formation and Reproduction," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 1 (March 1979): 47–69. There were similar initiatives in the other advantaged areas of Tanzania.

facilities when we already have functioning schools? Hence unofficial schools were upgraded and registered, and the government assumed responsibility for supporting and managing them. The local education officers were little able to propose an alternative expansion strategy since they depended on the church education secretaries for information on population densities and demand for schools, local willingness to contribute labor and materials, and the availability of existing facilities. As well, this strategy appealed to the central government since available funds could thus effectively create more new (i.e., newly government) school places. This voluntary nationalization in turn freed the funds and energies committed to the private schools to begin the process anew. In this way, Kilimanjaro's educational advantage was maintained (see table 1).

As this process unfolded, local residents, not national officials, had the primary initiative. Within the local area, the churches, able to provide leadership and draw on external funds, maintained their central educational role. An alliance of local politicians and church leaders, with local mass support, was thus effectively able to deflect a national redistributive policy. By focusing on the effort to protect the local area from what they portrayed as locally harmful national policies, they diverted attention from inequalities within Kilimanjaro. National officials felt unable to do much about this unplanned expansion. Kilimanjaro coffee production was too important to the national economy to risk significant local alienation and disruption in exports. As well, Kilimanjaro had its own allies in the center whose number increased as school expansion progressed.

I am not suggesting that this primary school expansion reflects a Kilimanjaro conspiracy to subvert national policy. Rather, in the tension between local and national interests, dedicated and honest (perhaps even progressive and socialist) people in Kilimanjaro, as they sought to improve the local situation, pursued strategies that in practice undermined national policy. That reflected in part a firmly entrenched understanding of development that emphasized Tanzania's integration into the world economy. That understanding was in turn rooted in values and an orientation implanted and nurtured during the period of European rule as the coffee-producing area functioned to link Tanganyika with that larger economy.¹¹

From Primary to Postprimary Education

By the end of the 1960s, popular demand began to shift from primary to postprimary education. At the same time, national policy was moving in the opposite direction. The 1967 policy paper "Education for Self Reliance" announced a change in educational priorities from a focus on

¹¹ On Kilimanjaro as a gateway to the world economy, see Joel Samoff and Rachel Samoff, "The Local Politics of Underdevelopment," *Politics and Society* 6, no. 4 (1976): 397–432.

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TABLE 1
PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT PER 1,000 POPULATION FOR KILIMANJARO
AND MAINLAND TANZANIA (Selected Years)

Year	Primary Enrollment per 1,000 Population	
	Kilimanjaro	Mainland Tanzania
1947	53.2	15.1
1956	81.2	41.4
1966	126.4	64.3
1969	120.4	65.2

SOURCES.—Tanzania, *Statistical Abstract* (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971); 1948, 1957, and 1969 censuses; Kilimanjaro District Education Office, 1969.

NOTE.—Kilimanjaro refers to Kilimanjaro District as defined in 1969; statistics for other years have been adjusted to correspond.

the development of high-level skills to an emphasis on a basic education for all Tanzanians. Swahili had already become the primary school language of instruction, and the curriculum was extensively revised. Upper-primary selection exams and school fees were eliminated. To reassert central direction, recapture the educational initiative, and revitalize legitimacy and popular participation, all private primary schools were nationalized in 1969.

This transition in policy focus from postprimary to primary education was consolidated in the 1974 declaration by the party's National Executive Committee that universal primary education was to be achieved much more rapidly than had originally been projected, that is, by 1977 rather than 1989.¹² If education were to perform the roles assigned to it—that is, equipping young people to function effectively as adults in their communities, fostering a sense of self-reliance, facilitating leaders' communication with the citizenry, building national unity, and promoting popular participation—it had to be available to all children. In the event, extraordinary energies and resources were mobilized. Primary school enrollment was doubled, some 37,000 new classrooms were constructed, and 40,000 new teachers were trained between 1973 and 1977. By the early 1980s, nearly all Tanzanian children could find school places.¹³

¹² TANU National Executive Committee; see also Omari et al., *Universal Primary Education in Tanzania*, pp. 38–40.

¹³ Since children enter school at different ages, several measures of enrollment are relevant. Data from 1984 suggest that there are enough school places for nearly all children (enrollment = 95 percent); that approximately two-thirds of the school-aged children are actually in school (enrollment = 68 percent); and that 80–90 percent of the children will eventually enter school. See Ministry of National Education, *The Primary School Sub-sector Review* (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Education, 1981); and Roy A. Carr-Hill, *Primary Education in Tanzania: A Review of the Research*, Education Division Document no. 16 (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority, 1984).

What that meant, of course, was not an end to demand for access to schools but rather a shift of terrain. Completing primary education was no longer sufficient to meet students' and parents' goals. The popular demand was for general secondary education, while government policy envisioned slow growth in secondary schools and emphasized technical and vocational education at the postprimary level. All Tanzanians were to have a basic education. The provision of postprimary education, however, was to be limited to anticipated human-resource needs.¹⁴ As well, vocational curricula were introduced in all secondary schools.¹⁵

The popular demand for general, rather than technical or vocational, secondary education was reinforced by the reward structure of schooling itself. First, evaluation, grading, and, thus, advancement within the schools continued to depend on success in academic subjects. Students' attention to English, history, mathematics, and so on had a much higher prospect of payoff than did energy invested in carpentry or the school farm. Second, employment possibilities and promotion criteria, even in technical and skilled-worker positions, also depended on examination results and thus favored general secondary, rather than vocational, education.¹⁶ Third, those who did not proceed to the end of the educational cycle were widely regarded as school leavers. As primary school expanded, the critical selection point was in the seventh year, when a small percentage was chosen for secondary school. Since only the students with the highest exam scores were admitted to secondary school, even those students who were selected for other postprimary programs had, in their own view and in terms of the selection procedures, failed.¹⁷

The restraints on secondary expansion also reinforced the preference for general secondary schools. As government primary school enrollment nearly quintupled from 1965 to 1981, enrollment in government secondary schools increased only 81 percent. While, at independence, more than one-third of the primary school students were selected for government

¹⁴ United Republic of Tanzania (n. 7 above), p. 148.

¹⁵ See I. M. Omari, "Diversification of Secondary School Curriculum and Learning Outcomes: Some Preliminary Results" (paper presented at Workshop on Decentralization of Research and Evaluation Capacities in Tanzania, Arusha, 1983); and George Psacharopoulos and William Loxley, *Diversified Secondary Education and Development: Evidence from Colombia and Tanzania* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

¹⁶ Faustini Boniface Mukyanuzi, "The Political Economy of Educational Reforms in Tanzania: The Secondary Education Curriculum and National Development" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1985).

¹⁷ The common term for those who successfully complete primary and even secondary school—"school leavers"—reflects the general view of early education as primarily preparatory for the higher levels. Those students who do not do well enough in their examinations to proceed to higher levels are not "finishers" or "completers" or perhaps primary or secondary "graduates" but, rather "leavers." The party has criticized this practice (see TANU National Executive Committee [n. 7 above], pp. 105–16). As King notes, selection for secondary school is the only measure of primary-school success (King [n. 4 above], pp. 7–8).

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TABLE 2
SELECTION TO SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN TANZANIA AS A PROPORTION OF STUDENTS COMPLETING
STANDARD VII/VIII (Selected Years)

Year	Students Completing Standard VII/VIII	Selected for Form I as Percentage of Students Completing Standard VII/VIII					
		Government Schools		Private Schools		Government and Private	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
1962	13,730	4,810	35.0	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1965	29,367	5,942	20.2	458	1.6	6,400	21.8
1970	64,630	7,350	11.4	3,021	4.7	10,371	16.0
1975	137,559	8,680	6.3	5,114	3.7	13,794	10.0
1980	212,446	8,913	4.2	6,677	3.1	15,590	7.3
1985	429,194	10,881	2.5	11,745	2.7	22,626	5.3

SOURCE.—United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Education, *Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania (BEST), 1981–1985* (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Education, 1986), p. 7.

NOTE.—For the data presented here, Tanzania means mainland Tanzania.

secondary schools, that percentage had fallen to one-tenth by 1970 and to 2 percent by 1982 (see table 2). Earlier, few Tanzanians could enter primary school. As primary education became universally available, still only very few could proceed to secondary school. It was on that access that the new demand focused.

Kilimanjaro: Secondary School Expansion

Private secondary education mushroomed. By the mid-1970s, Kilimanjaro had more private than government secondary schools. By 1984, one-fourth of all the secondary schools and fully 42 percent of all the private secondary schools in the country were in Kilimanjaro Region, whose residents were 5.3 percent of the total mainland Tanzanian population (see table 3).¹⁸ Kilimanjaro students constituted 28.7 percent of all of the Form 5 students in Tanzania in 1982; in ethnic terms, the Chagga, 3.7 percent of the national population, provided 20.5 percent of those Form 5 students.¹⁹

The contemporary pattern of secondary school expansion is in many ways similar to the earlier expansion at the primary level. Local residents,

¹⁸ Government data generally refer to registered (government and private) secondary schools and thus understate the actual number of schools and students in Kilimanjaro and perhaps elsewhere where schools open prior to registration. Unregistered private secondary-school students do regard themselves as having completed secondary education and seek employment on that basis. Since most such schools eventually secure registration, it makes sense to include them in the secondary school data, as I have done here. Note that, unlike the government secondary schools, whose students come from throughout the country, with few exceptions private secondary schools draw largely from their immediate area.

¹⁹ See G. A. Malekela, "Access to Secondary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Tanzanian Experiment" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1983), pp. 154, 160; cited in Cooksey and Ishumi (n. 4 above), pp. 17, 28.

TABLE 3
SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND ENROLLMENT, GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE, FOR KILIMANJARO REGION AS PERCENTAGE OF TANZANIA (Selected Years)

Year	Government						Private						Total	
	Schools			Students			Schools			Students			Schools	
	Kilimanjaro Region	% of Tanzania	% of Kilimanjaro Region	Kilimanjaro Region	% of Tanzania	% of Kilimanjaro Region	Kilimanjaro Region	% of Tanzania	% of Kilimanjaro Region	Kilimanjaro Region	% of Tanzania	% of Kilimanjaro Region	Kilimanjaro Region	% of Tanzania
1965	8	12	2,543	12	...	0	...	0	...	8	11	2,543	11	11
1969	8	11	3,351	11	4	11	812	10	12	12	11	4,163	11	11
1972	8	11	3,907	12	7	18	1,783	17	15	15	13	5,690	13	13
1976	9	11	4,542	11	N.A.	N.A.	3,414	20	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	7,956	14	14
1978	9	11	4,564	11	N.A.	N.A.	5,133	23	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	9,697	15	15
1982	9	11	4,343	11	24	30	9,085	30	33	33	20	13,428	19	19
1984	9	11	4,414	11	35	42	9,438	28	44	44	26	13,852	19	19

SOURCES.—Ministry of (National) Education; and Joel Samoff; field research, Kilimanjaro Region, 1984.

NOTE.—Statistics provided by different sources do not fully agree. I have listed here what I regard as the most accurate figure. (Note that, in many sources, school and enrollment data in fact refer only to government schools.)

frequently with active church leadership and assistance, support the creation of a new secondary school. Often, because such schools do not meet government standards, they are not initially formally registered as secondary schools. Over time, some schools manage to upgrade their facilities, equipment, and staff; secure official registration; and compete with the government schools. Other private schools struggle along from year to year, eventually achieving registration though unable to offer a secondary school program comparable in either breadth or quality to that of the government schools. Formal rules and community sentiment bar entrepreneurial private schools. Private (i.e., nongovernmental) secondary schools must be owned and managed by approved voluntary agencies, community organizations, or local government.

Although the process of creating private secondary schools varies somewhat, there are many common elements. In general, a prominent local individual, often a priest or minister, convenes local residents to propose creating a secondary school. After a period of discussion and planning and usually after some encouragement from church and/or government and/or party, an organizing committee is formally composed and fund-raising begins. The money needed to open the school is raised by a combination of an assessment on local residents, donations from affluent local people, and, occasionally, grants or equipment from a church or other agency (including, at times, foreign-aid programs or overseas charities). Suitable buildings are identified, negotiations are undertaken to secure their use, and local labor is mobilized for construction. An initial staff is recruited, usually including a few teachers from government secondary schools and other individuals who completed secondary school (Form 6) but who were not selected for postsecondary educational programs and who have not had formal teacher training. As soon as is manageable, the school announces itself and begins to recruit students. Operating funds come from student fees, from a continued donation campaign, and often from a produce tax (see table 4).

Fund-raising is thus both informal and formal, private and public. The campaign for private donations involves strong pressure on affluent local residents. While the assessment on each local household in the early 1980s (commonly, TSh 100–200) was formally voluntary, in effect the local village governments created a school tax. Similarly, the cess on coffee sales was reinstituted. This tax, a major source of funding for school expansion in the 1950s and 1960s before the abolition of cooperatives, seemed an appropriate strategy for securing funds. In some communities compliance was voluntary, but in most areas the cess was formally approved by the village governments and collected by the national Coffee Authority as it purchased farmers' coffee.

TABLE 4
FUNDING SOURCES FOR STARTUP AND FIRST-YEAR OPERATION FOR NEW PRIVATE
SECONDARY SCHOOL, KILIMANJARO, 1983–85

	TSh
Startup funds needed (to move primary school students and repair former middle school for secondary school use)	540,000
Sources:	
Household levy (TSh 600 × 500 households)	300,000
Donations in kind (tools, sand, stones, cement, and transport)	120,000
Individual donations	120,000
Total	540,000
First-year operating funds needed	600,000
Sources:	
Student fees (TSh 2,070 × 80 students)	165,600
Lunch fees (TSh 10/student/day)	184,000
Building-fund levy (TSh 500/local student; TSh 1,000/student from outside local area)	44,000
Proceeds from self-reliance projects (first year)	5,000
Individual donations	100,000
Village support (coffee tax and donations)	92,500
Total	591,000

SOURCE.—Church Education Secretary, personal communication with author, Moshi, 1984.

NOTE.—At mid-1984 official rates, U.S.\$1.00 = TSh 17.20. Hence, TSh 100,000 was approximately U.S.\$5,814.

As privately managed but, effectively, public institutions, private secondary schools must operate within rules set by the Ministry of Education, though some deviations are tolerated. Registration is formally required and usually eventually secured, but it is common for schools to operate unregistered for the first few years. Curriculum, class size, examinations, and so on must conform to ministry policy. In practice, many private secondary schools have classes that are larger than official policy permits and are unable to provide books, materials, laboratories, and other facilities that meet government standards. Like government schools, private secondary schools are subject to school inspections. Indeed, the Ministry of Education Inspectorate both indicates what is required for registration and occasionally offers political advice on how to negotiate around obstacles. The government will also second a ministry employee to serve as a private school headmaster. Fees are set by ministry directive (in 1984, TSh 2,070 for day schools and TSh 4,140 for boarding schools per year). All private schools find ways to assess additional fees, usually designated for a specific project (e.g., a building fee to construct an assembly hall) and usually with ministry approval. Most private schools also charge an entry fee, usually less for local children and more for students from outside the local area whose parents were not taxed to create the school.

To restrain regional differentiation, government rules require that 25 percent of the private secondary school students come from outside the local area. The more attractive schools meet that requirement without difficulty, while others effectively ignore it. School headmasters and managers assert forcefully that, since the school has been created to meet local community needs and is financed from local sources, local children have the highest priority for admission. The private school admission examination threshold is usually lower for local applicants than for children from other areas. Local students who do tolerably well can be confident of securing a place.

Some of the private secondary schools are very attractive. One, with a national reputation and a national clientele that includes prominent political elites, had some 2,000 applicants for the 160 places in its 1983 entering class. Many Kilimanjaro private secondary schools administer their own entrance examination, and some require interviews for prospective students. Students from the strongest of the private secondary schools do relatively well in the national Form 4 examinations.²⁰

It is widely believed in Kilimanjaro that church-sponsored schools will be more successful in securing financial assistance, books and materials, and trained teachers. This preference for church management is reinforced by the informal and formal quality ranking of Kilimanjaro private secondary schools. Both major Kilimanjaro churches (Roman Catholic and Lutheran) have active education secretaries who provide direct managerial services, recruit teachers, deal with education officials, negotiate with potential donors, and address intraschool and school-community problems. Tanzania's national Muslim organization, BAKWATA, provides similar services for its Kilimanjaro secondary school, which necessarily draws on a geographically much more dispersed pool since there are relatively few Muslims in the area. Church affiliation is not automatically granted. Proposed schools' financial viability and depth and strength of local support are carefully assessed. The churches are reluctant to become managers without a clear acknowledgement of their decision-making authority. Thus, from the community's perspective, church management has clear advantages, but, where the local clergy have not been active participants from the outset, the price of those advantages is a reduction of local autonomy.

The party's parents' auxiliary (Jumuiya ya Wazazi, the successor to the Tanganyika African Parents Association) also manages several of the

²⁰ Students from government and registered private secondary schools are not distinguished in sitting the Form 4 examinations and in eligibility for selection to post-Form 4 programs. Kilimanjaro secondary schools in general rank high on this criterion. In 1983, five of the nine government secondary schools ranked second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth nationally, while the highest-ranked private secondary school (35 nationally) was also in Kilimanjaro (see *Wizara ya Elimu ya Taifa, Mfanikio ya Shule Katika Mtiiani wa Taifa wa Kidato cha Nne Mwaka 1983* [Dar es Salaam: Ministry of National Education, July 19, 1984]).

Kilimanjaro private secondary schools. The regional and district Wazazi offices are far less well staffed and equipped, and their personnel have far less management experience and are more likely to be newcomers to the region than are their church counterparts. In practice, the Wazazi officials function directly as managers for only a few of the formally Wazazi schools; others are managed by a local community group under the Wazazi umbrella. In the initial stages of opening private schools, parents use the Swahili term *wazazi* (parents) to refer to the nascent organization of parents and local residents, usually without formal linkage to the *Jumuiya ya Wazazi* as an institution. Having called their school a *wazazi* school from the outset, they may eventually seek formal association with Wazazi. That alternative is especially attractive where the community is evenly divided between adherents to the two churches (infrequent, but not unusual) or in which the organizing committee (or headmaster) has strong local support and is at odds with the dominant local church. Most communities, however, prefer association with one of the churches and eventually seek it.

The politics of this process are striking. Private secondary school creation in Kilimanjaro involves constructing a coalition that includes representatives of the local community (often village chairmen); church personnel (both local clergy and the parish organization); government officials (especially, but not solely, education officers); party leaders (at local, district, and, occasionally, regional levels); and key individual politicians (e.g., members of Parliament) who can organize locally, raise funds, and intervene for the school in Dar es Salaam. Especially where there is no single dynamic local leader capable of managing both popular support and good liaison with extracommunity organizations, those coalitions are difficult to maintain. Conflicts between the organizing committee and church education officials, between headmaster and manager, and between community and government education officers are not uncommon. What is involved is a scarce and highly desired good, namely, access to secondary school, which is deemed to be the critical gateway to the path of individual and communal progress. In that respect, many of the conflicts that revolve around the creation of private secondary schools reflect the economic, political, social, and ideological divisions and clashes in the larger society.

Seeking to create new secondary schools, Kilimanjaro residents effectively recreated local government and cooperatives.²¹ Briefly, what was termed "decentralization" in the early 1970s eliminated elected local councils and was followed by the dissolution of cooperatives. In their absence,

²¹ I discuss this process more fully in Joel Samoff, "Populist Initiatives and Local Government in Tanzania" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association, Madison, Wisc., 1986). The official restoration of local government and cooperatives in the 1980s is too recent to assess the interactions among the rejuvenated local councils and the school-organizing committees.

school-organizing committees in Kilimanjaro came to assume some of their functions including representing local citizens, negotiating on behalf of the local community, and even levying taxes.

Persistent Demand

Clearly, there are significant expenses involved in sending children to the private secondary schools. Local residents are taxed to create the school in the first place. There are fees for the admissions examination, for entry, for special projects, and for tuition. There are costs for preadmission site visits and travel. There are also continuing pressures for further contributions. Overall, parents' expenditures per private secondary school student average three times those for their government-school counterparts.²² At the same time, by the usual measures of quality, most private secondary schools cannot compete with their government counterparts. Why, then, does demand for access outstrip even a rapidly expanding supply?

As I have noted, access to education is seen as the critical avenue for both individual and community progress. Since universal primary education has largely been achieved and since alternative postprimary educational programs continue to have lower status, that demand for access has come to focus on the general secondary schools. For individuals, an investment in secondary education, even an inferior secondary education, holds the potential for a substantial return. That the actual return to many, perhaps most, students who complete secondary school is less than expected; that many, perhaps most, secondary school students do not secure the positions, salaries, and perquisites they desire; and that a significant percentage of those who complete secondary school will eventually return to farming does not make the investment irrational. For most parents, there is no alternative investment on their children that holds as much promise or that is as likely to yield as substantial a return.²³ For communities, the investment in private secondary schools is understood as an investment in future power and influence. As one (highly educated) prominent politician from another area put it in 1984, "The spread of education is the spread of power. The peasants recognize that. When our farmers go to the bank for a loan, they encounter bank officials from Kilimanjaro, who are often unsympathetic. If we want our people to be those bank officials, we must build our children a school. Expenditures on roads and clinics can wait. Once our people have power and influence, those things will come. Meanwhile, since they are building more schools for their children, if we do not do the same, we will fall farther behind."

²² Jee-Peng Tan, "The Private Direct Cost of Secondary Schooling in Tanzania," *International Journal of Educational Development* 5, no. 1 (1985): 1-10, 3.

²³ Kilemi Mwiria, "The Kenya Harambee School Movement: A Historical Perspective" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1985).

As high as they are, the actual costs of a private secondary education probably keep few children out of school. Since so few students are ultimately admitted and since access is so highly valued, parents whose children are selected will make extraordinary efforts to find the necessary funds by drawing on relatives, friends, neighbors, and other networks. Although the private secondary schools do not have formal scholarship programs, most have several students whose fees are paid, at least in part, by the local church or another agency.

While children from poorer families who are selected may manage to enter secondary school, it does seem likely that differences in parents' wealth manifest themselves long before secondary-school selection: progress in school is related to parents' socioeconomic status.²⁴ Affluent parents are less likely to require their children to devote many hours to tending the fields or herding animals. They can also purchase private instruction during the primary school years and provide a home environment that is more supportive of educational achievement. Children of affluent parents are likely to have traveled more and to have more frequent opportunities to hear and speak English (emphasized in the selection examinations and the secondary school language of instruction). Affluent parents are better able to establish residences elsewhere in the country where their children can repeat or have reduced competition. Finally, affluent parents are better situated, in terms of both available funds and political efficacy, to increase the number of private secondary schools in their community and to improve their quality.

Yet, notwithstanding this rapid expansion of private secondary schools, it remains the case that parents and children prefer government secondary schools. Not only are the government schools less costly (until 1984, they were free; even with the introduction of fees in 1985, they remain significantly less costly than do private schools), but they are, in everyone's view, simply better.

Secondary School as Adult Education

It is important to note the recent development of another avenue for secondary education both in Kilimanjaro and elsewhere in Tanzania:

²⁴ Studies of African education provide conflicting findings on the relation between socioeconomic status and access to, and success in, school. It has often proved difficult to distinguish the independent significance of socioeconomic status from the effect of differences in ethnicity, race, gender, urban residence, and other factors. This is probably especially problematic in countries like Tanzania, where most students come from a peasant background and very few are selected to proceed: there is so little variation in both independent and dependent variables that the consequences of status differences are overwhelmed. The evidence in Tanzania does suggest, however, that the rate of school success is higher for elite children. For an overview, see Kenneth Blakemore and Brian Cooksey, *A Sociology of Education for Africa* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), chap. 3; see also David Court and Kabiru Kinyanjui, "Development Policy and Educational Opportunity: The Experience of Kenya and Tanzania," in *Regional Disparities in Educational Development*, ed. Gabriel Carron and Ta Ngoc Chau (Paris: Unesco/IIEP, 1980).

evening classes sponsored by the Institute of Adult Education.²⁵ Recognizing the strength of the demand for general secondary education, many of the institute's local branches have shifted their focus from older adults to primary school "leavers." What have emerged are effectively independent secondary schools with a restricted curriculum. Classes are held after school hours in secondary school facilities and are taught by secondary school staff paid on an hourly basis. Without facilities of their own, these evening schools generally do not offer technical subjects or classes that require laboratories or other specialized equipment; students must purchase their own books and materials. Nor do they include the agricultural self-reliance projects required in regular secondary schools. In other respects, however, the curriculum is identical to that of other secondary schools, including quizzes, term tests, and examinations.

The Kilimanjaro office of the Institute of Adult Education seems to have been particularly energetic in developing these programs. By mid-1984, there were 884 students enrolled in such classes in Kilimanjaro Region, located in 11 schools and involving 205 teachers, with 48 students doing secondary course work by correspondence.²⁶ Approximately half the students entered the evening secondary school program directly after completing primary school; only 1–2 percent were employed adults with more than a few years of postprimary experience. Females outnumbered males in most forms and most schools. A special entry examination was less demanding than the national Standard VII examination. Unsuccessful applicants were permitted, indeed encouraged, to try again. Although fees have risen rapidly since the creation of these programs, at TSh 1,400 per year in 1984, they were lower than tuition for private secondary school. Although none of the evening schools in Kilimanjaro offered all the regular secondary subjects, students were expected to be ready to sit the Form 4 examination after 4 years' instruction. Since these programs are quite young, few students had reached that point by 1984; those few who had did not score well.

Thus young people in Kilimanjaro who were not among the 2 percent selected to proceed from primary to government secondary school had other paths to secondary education (see table 5). Even those who were not admitted to registered private secondary schools could seek places in unregistered private secondary schools or in evening programs sponsored by the Institute of Adult Education.

²⁵ For overviews, see Budd L. Hall, *Adult Education and the Development of Socialism in Tanzania* (Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1975); Hinzén and Hunsdorfer, eds. (n. 4 above); and Yusuf O. Kassam, *The Adult Education Revolution in East Africa* (Nairobi: Shungwaya, 1978).

²⁶ Institute of Adult Education, "Taarifa ya Miezi Mitatu, Aprili–Juni, 1984" (Moshi: Institute of Adult Education, 1984, mimeographed).

TABLE 5
KILIMANJARO SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS IN HAI, MOSHI RURAL, MOSHI URBAN, AND ROMBO DISTRICTS, 1984

School Manager	Registered		Unregistered		Totals		
	Schools	Students	Schools	Students	Schools		Students
					N	%	
Government	8	4,300	0	0	8	24	4,300
Institute of Adult Education*	...	...	...	...	...	...	884
Private:†							
Catholic	10	4,088	0	0	10	30	4,088
Lutheran	2	801	3	567	5	15	1,368
Muslim	1	640	0	0	1	3	640
Wazari	3	1,523	3	835	6	18	2,358
YMCA	2	977	0	0	2	6	977
Private board‡	1	148	0	0	1	3	148
Total	27 (19)	12,477 (8,177)	6 (6)	1,402 (1,402)	33 (25)	100 (76)	14,763 (9,579)
							100 (65)

SOURCE.—Joel Samoff, field research, Kilimanjaro Region, 1984.

* Institute of Adult Education correspondence students not included.

† Totals for private school managers are in parentheses.

‡ International School Moshi, whose curriculum departs from the national syllabus and whose enrollment is 50 percent Tanzanian.

Secondary School Expansion, National Policy, and Politics in Tanzania

Secondary schooling has expanded much more rapidly than was envisioned by national leaders and educational planners in the 1970s, often despite formal and informal efforts to restrain that expansion.²⁷ Notwithstanding the requirements that each secondary school have a vocational orientation and that private secondary schools have a technical bias, expansion has been guided more by popular demand and local politics than by a detailed plan for meeting national manpower needs.

In 1974 mass demand for expanded access to primary education became public policy in the party's Musoma Resolution. Similarly, mass demand for general secondary education in the 1980s has also been translated into public policy. That transition from a tightly controlled human-resource orientation to a greater responsiveness to popular demand had in fact already been suggested in the Musoma Resolution: "the policy guidelines regarding higher education (be it secondary, technical or university education) stated that it should be offered only for the purpose of satisfying the demands for high level manpower needs for our development. . . . In our present situation, we need to re-examine this premise. . . . It behooves the National Executive Committee to consider very seriously the need to expand secondary education so as to enable more pupils who complete primary education to obtain places in Form I and continue with secondary education."²⁸ The victory of popular demand over human-resource allocation is reflected in the deliberations and recommendations of the 1980–82 Presidential Commission on Education. Government secondary schools are to be doubled within the next decade. By the year 2000, 15 percent of the children completing primary school are to have places in government secondary schools. Most barriers to private secondary education have been removed, and local councils will be permitted to provide subventions to private schools.²⁹

At a first level, then, while the language, vocabulary, and rhetoric of planning have been retained, popular demand has prevailed over centralized planning in the recent expansion of secondary education in Tanzania.

²⁷ This failure to restrain secondary school expansion is a major element in King's conclusion that education for self-reliance has largely failed (see King [n. 4 above]). It seems to me, however, that the policy of limiting secondary school expansion was to a large extent a function of expected resource availability. Unable to finance that expansion, policymakers rationalized that secondary expansion was not necessary, even undesirable. Since private secondary schools tap resources otherwise unavailable to the government, the expansion of secondary education has proceeded more rapidly than was anticipated.

²⁸ TANU National Executive Committee (n. 7 above), pp. 107–8.

²⁹ United Republic of Tanzania, *Educational System in Tanzania towards the Year 2000: Recommendations of the 1982 Presidential Commission on Education as Approved by the Party and Government* (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Education, 1984), pp. 8–11; and, for the full report and recommendations, see Tanzania, *Mfumo wa Elimu ya Tanzania, 1981–2000: Ripoti na Mapendekezo ya Tume ya Rais ya Elimu* vols. 1, 2 (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Education, 1982).

Although that expansion is too recent to permit a full assessment of its longer-term consequences, it is possible to make some shorter-term observations.

Development as Local Politics

Efforts to impose firm central direction on educational expansion in the context of Tanzania's single-party state not only generated local resistance but also made the local setting the key arena for political activity. When prospects for modifying national policy are dim and when the potential cost of a direct challenge to that policy is assessed to be quite high, efforts to alter the outcomes shift to the site of implementation. So indeed for secondary school expansion in Kilimanjaro.³⁰ The important debates there were not about education for self-reliance but rather revolved around which groups could successfully invoke national policy to defend their own agendas. In the rhetoric of the school-organizing committees, what could be more self-reliant than opening a new school? The important initiatives were not those of the Ministry of Education, which found it difficult even to maintain the existing schools, or of the Ministry of Education Inspectorate, which acknowledged frankly its inability to close even the worst of the unregistered schools, but rather those of local politicians, church leaders, and their allies. Development policy was at least as much a function of local politics as of national planning and at least as much private as public.

Politics, of course, is a process without definitive victors. It seems likely that as this expansion continues there will be an increased recognition of the new forms of regional differentiation followed by new efforts to use state power to challenge those inequalities and to use public funds to assist the relatively disadvantaged areas. This alternation of policy direction has characterized educational policy over the past 2 decades: emphasis on high-level skills in the early 1960s (resources concentrated in postprimary programs); concern about inequality in the late 1960s (selection quotas and nationalization of private schools) followed by response to local initiatives (acquiescence in regional differentiation); reassertion of egalitarianism and socialism in the 1970s (universal basic education and barriers to private secondary schools); and a return to the concern with education's training roles and a response to mass demand in the 1980s (vocalization, doubling government secondary schools, and encouraging private schools).

³⁰ During the era of British rule as well, the constraints on national political activity imposed by an authoritarian central administration often confined political struggles, even on national issues, to local arenas. This was especially clear in Kilimanjaro, where, through much of the first half of this century, local politicians' efforts to establish national organizations and to influence national policy were thwarted. One consequence of this localization of politics was to nurture regional and ethnic nationalism and to forge a strong local solidarity that persists to the present. See Samoff, *Tanzania* (n. 10 above), pp. 22–31.

In the tensions among national manpower needs, the commitment to equality, and the mass demand for education and between relatively advantaged and disadvantaged regions, schooling in its local setting will remain a primary site for national struggle.

Centralized Planning versus Local Autonomy

Tension between centralized planning and local autonomy is manifested in the conflicts over school expansion. National policy is predicated on central direction. The formal structure of the educational system locates decision-making authority at the center and only by delegation at the periphery. Yet many of the national educational officials feel helpless. From their perspective popular demand for schooling is overwhelming in a situation in which the resources under their control can scarcely operate the existing educational institutions let alone meet the demand for more. Although there are clearly stated policies and rules that set the conditions for educational expansion, officials find themselves impotent, unable to close unregistered or otherwise illegal schools.

For the present, the initiative lies elsewhere. National officials set the formal rules, but locally based coalitions open schools. National policy for educational expansion is organized around a plan for developing particular skills. Actual practice is much more chaotic. In many existing secondary schools the vocational curriculum has a formal existence but little practical content. In most of the new schools the skills orientation is even less visible. This assertion of local autonomy is likely to be reinforced by the current reintroduction of local government and agricultural co-operatives. Asserting the national ideology of self-reliance, local coalitions will seek to create a more secure political base by gaining control over the new institutions. Indeed, to some extent that has already occurred: the school-organizing committees are in practice protolocal government councils. As such, they probably link village, ward, and district levels much more effectively than did the previous district councils.

In the view of the Tanzanian leadership, socialist construction requires both centralized planning and significant local autonomy. The apparent tension between them masks the underlying conflict between who controls the central planning and who dominates the local arena. That is, the fundamental conflict is not primarily about preferred institutional arrangements but rather about power, about who rules.³¹ Different claimants to power will at different moments find it advantageous to advocate more or less centralization. In terms of school expansion, during the late 1970s it was the representatives of relatively disadvantaged regions who preferred greater centralization. Their goal was to impose a national redistributive

³¹ Joel Samoff, "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Power in Tanzania: The Institutional Context of Class Struggle," *Journal of African Studies* 10, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 84–96.

policy. In that era, Kilimanjaro leaders espoused local autonomy to limit the redistribution. Now that national policy envisions rapid secondary school expansion and encourages the creation of private schools, sentiment in Kilimanjaro is much more supportive of centralization on this issue. Formerly regarded as obstacles to local interests, the educational administrators have become allies.

In this way, although the populist character of the demand for more schools might seem a welcome antidote to a cumbersome educational bureaucracy and to impersonal and distant central planners, in practice the local initiatives, though surely for the moment popular, may not be populist. There is ample evidence from the earlier era of local government councils to suggest that in many areas local elites will dominate the local councils and, eventually, the local party organizations in their efforts to insulate themselves from both national direction and socialism. That is, what will be portrayed by its advocates as a populist political program is likely in practice to increase inequalities within as well as between regions.³² While mass demand has in part dictated the new policy, its implementation clearly benefits some more than others. What many citizens regard as a strategy for closing the gap between aspirations and outcomes is likely to expand rather than reduce it.

The Focus on Region and District (Ethnicity)

By emphasizing region and district as the principal units of political interaction, the organizational arrangements of educational policy divert attention from other societal cleavages. There are now two decades of reports by both academics and educational officials on regional and district inequalities in access to education and several waves of policy attention to those inequalities. School expansion was slowed in some areas while accelerated in others. Government resources were directed toward less well served regions. Regional quotas for secondary-school selection were introduced, doubling the promotion rate in regions with fewer secondary school students. Public programs in some regions compensate for private initiatives in others. It is striking, however, that this concern with inequality focuses on regional and thus, in the popular perception, tribal differentiation and not on inequalities of gender, religion, race, or class, which are at least as dramatic in quantitative terms as are the differences among regions.

There has in fact been policy attention to the education of females in Tanzania. Beginning primary school classes are now 50 percent female—no small accomplishment. The percentage of girls has increased at all levels. Major educational policies (e.g., the 1974 requirement that secondary school students have 2 years of work experience prior to university

³² That the children of political elites are disproportionately represented among secondary school students is confirmed by the findings of a recent national survey; see Malekela (n. 19 above).

admission) have been modified because they were found to depress female enrollment. The Presidential Commission on Education proposed as a policy goal the elimination of gender inequalities in secondary and higher education. Yet it remains the case both that beyond primary school the percentage of female students declines dramatically and that the equalization policies implemented thus far are primarily concerned with regional origin, not gender. Efforts to reduce gender inequality have yet to address the discriminatory consequences of the large number of sexually segregated boarding government secondary schools and the gender specification of one of the four vocational specializations, that is, home economics.

Statistics on students' religious preferences are not readily available. Indirect evidence suggests that Muslim students are a smaller proportion of the total school enrollment than are Muslims a proportion of the total population. This differentiation is rarely addressed directly, and there are not, to my knowledge, formal policies designed to increase the proportion of Muslim students. Similarly, there is indirect evidence that higher proportions of Asian and European (both very small populations in Tanzania) than of African children are in school. Africanization of high-level jobs has been a major national policy commitment that has been defined and, with occasional exceptions, implemented in terms of citizenship rather than race. There is no comparable Africanization or Tanzanianization policy for schooling.

Schools do not maintain records of students' social strata. Several studies, as well as nearly all observers, confirm that the children of more affluent parents are more likely to enter school and to progress farther than children of less affluent parents. Although income stratification is only a partial indicator of class differences, it seems clear that children from the middle and upper classes are more likely to get more and better schooling than are workers' and peasants' children.

In short, while region (ethnicity) is regarded as an important and appropriate focus and organizing unit of public policy and political activity, religion, race, class, and perhaps gender (in recent years the subject of increased policy attention) are not. Put somewhat differently, regional (ethnic) differences are highly politicized, while the other social cleavages are deemed politically less significant. Perhaps regional (ethnic) inequalities are the primary focus of policy attention because other social cleavages seem politically less threatening. The small size of the European and Asian populations and their apparent political insignificance makes their educational advantage seem unimportant. Religious differences have thus far not been highly divisive in Tanzania even during the 1985 presidential election, when a Zanzibari Muslim succeeded the Catholic Julius Nyerere. Koranic and other Muslim schools have never been a serious academic alternative to secular (i.e., Western and, at least unofficially, Christian)

education. And the Tanzanian leadership has regularly sought to constrain social differentiation both within and outside schools.

This explanation, however, begs the question by assuming that ethnic identities are inherently more powerful and more incompatible than other identities. A more fruitful analytic perspective, I think, sets out to explore which identities have been politicized (and why and how they have been) and to examine the intersections among the different identity patterns.³³ The politicization of ethnicity (as opposed to the inherently political character of ethnic identities) has strong roots in Africa.³⁴ More important, it continues to be nurtured in the present, in part precisely by policies that reinforce ethnic identities in an effort to reduce regional inequalities. Why? I suggest that the other social cleavages are perceived by policymakers as both less pressing and ultimately more threatening and thus essential to exclude from policy attention for fear of generating or exacerbating unmanageable hostilities.³⁵ That is, ethnic conflict may seem more immediately divisive and at the same time more tractable than class conflict; or, rather, the management of ethnic conflict need not threaten the political order, while the intensification of class conflict surely will. That leaves unexplained, however, why citizens themselves do not regard the other inequalities as both politically salient and a focus for political action, an issue that cannot be fully explored here.³⁶

Regional inequalities in access to schooling do have far-reaching societal consequences. Schooling, after all, is the major recruitment mechanism for wage employment in general and especially for high-level positions. Those regions with more schools and with more children in school will be better represented in decision making throughout the society. Although ethnic inequalities may become in themselves an important political issue, perhaps even more important is a much less visible consequence of the

³³ For a fuller discussion than is possible here, see Joel Samoff, "Pluralism and Conflict in Africa: Ethnicity, Institutions and Class in Tanzania," *Civilisations* 32, no. 2/33, no. 1 (1982–83): 97–134; see also John S. Saul, "The Dialectic of Class and Tribe," in *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, by John S. Saul (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).

³⁴ As does the politicization of racial identities, which have not received comparable educational policy attention in Tanzania.

³⁵ Many scholars share that perception—in this arena, what researchers choose to document not only reflects but may well influence the policy agenda.

³⁶ For recent overviews of the debate on politics in Tanzania, see Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982); and Rodger Yeager, *Tanzania: A Political Experiment* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982). For the major perspectives on Tanzanian politics (an extensive and divergent literature), see Göran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980); Susanne D. Mueller, "Retarded Capitalism in Tanzania," *Socialist Register* 1980, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville (London: Merlin, 1980); Cranford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Joel Samoff, "Crises and Socialism in Tanzania," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 19, no. 2 (June 1981): 279–306; John S. Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); and Yash Tandon, ed., *Debate on Class, State and Imperialism* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1982).

regional disparities in access to education: the institutionalization of a particular worldview.

From this perspective, Kilimanjaro residents, influenced by their own recent past, are carriers of an ideology that is distinctly unsocialist. As coffee made Kilimanjaro a gateway between Tanganyika and the world economy, a particular understanding of development and, therefore, of desirable national policies and of Tanzania's global role was elaborated. Put simply, development was understood to require the integration of Tanzania into the world system. Kilimanjaro residents were therefore quite receptive to the development advice proffered by a World Bank mission to Tanzania at its independence: emphasize export production, maintain good relations with traditional trading partners, encourage individual entrepreneurs, support the most successful farmers, and aim at growth now and at equality when the level of growth makes that feasible. That perspective continues to be articulated energetically as is the corresponding critique of the emphasis in Tanzania's official development strategy: on tight exchange controls, increased trade with socialist countries, nationalization of major economic enterprises, severe constraints on individual accumulation and consumption, insistence on equality and growth, and, in general, a challenge to the very nature of the world system. Kilimanjaro's relative advantage in access to schooling is thus not simply a matter of ethnic imbalance but is as well one dimension of the institutionalization of an ideology. That ideology nurtures the aggressive maintenance of the myth of meritocracy. Where socialism is rhetoric to be tolerated and managed and where school-farm projects and vocationalized secondary education are appropriate for the less successful students, it is desirable, indeed necessary, that academic examinations determine promotion and that those who complete the basic educational program be regarded as school leavers. If Tanzania desperately needs the skills of its most competent citizens, then schools and examinations should be organized around advancement by competence. In this worldview, evidence of status inequalities identifies aberrations to be corrected, not the inadequacy of the selection system itself. What matters is quality, which has to do with academic accomplishment and not socialist militance. Thus, in terms of both ideology and inequality, the educational policy concerns of a leadership that has announced its commitment to socialist construction are focused more on ethnicity than on class.

Technicians and Politicians

The thrust of recent educational policy changes reflects the technical-administrative orientation that has come more visibly to dominate the national leadership and national policy in Tanzania. To employ a rough but convenient shorthand, in the struggles among the contenders for power in Tanzania, the experts have displaced the politicians. The relative

dominance in the late 1960s and mid-1970s of a political perspective that regarded development as at its core a political process and that emphasized politicization, mobilization, and, to some extent, socialism was by the early 1980s supplanted by a return to the view that development is principally a technical process. Again, put crudely, in the popular perception the politicians had simply failed to produce³⁷ and as a consequence suffered an erosion of legitimacy. The need to import cereal grains in the mid-1970s weakened their base, though it was restored somewhat by the economic recovery and military victory of the late 1970s. The continuing difficulties in meeting the demand for both basic foods and consumer goods in this decade have further weakened that political base or, rather, have reinforced the political claims of the technocratic orientation.

Although it is impossible here to assemble extensive evidence for, or to discuss in detail the sources and consequences of, this transition, its symbolic manifestations are, I think, reasonably clear. Individuals widely regarded as relatively apolitical now head key ministries, para-statal, and other organizations. The visible portions of public policy debate, in which at other times political concerns have been paramount (e.g., arguments about which proposed policy is more clearly socialist), are now more often dominated by discussions of ostensibly apolitical policy alternatives defended in terms of their technical merit. The recent relaxation of restrictions on consumer goods and luxury imports, for example, has been defended largely in terms of economic rationality, not socialist construction (notwithstanding the socialist terminology employed).

Within education, the recommendations of the presidential commission appointed in 1980 were developed and presented in terms of attention to the (academic) quality of education, its costs, and its training roles rather than in terms of education for socialist construction, or redistribution, or equality. In large part, the policy thrust preferred by the professional educators—including fees for government secondary schools, doubling those schools, and encouraging private educational institutions—prevailed over the objections of those concerned that charging fees for admission to the key recruitment mechanism and leaving much of its development in private hands were inconsistent with basic egalitarianism, democratic participation, and socialism. Strong opposition to some of the recommendations, apparently centered in the party's National Executive Com-

³⁷ A review of the debate on the health of the Tanzanian economy and the causes of its problems is beyond the scope of this paper. The major positions in that debate are available in Reginald H. Green, D. G. Rwegasira, and B. Van Arkadie, *Economic Shocks and National Policy Making: Tanzania in the 1970s* (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1980); International Labour Organization, *Basic Needs in Danger: A Basic Needs Oriented Development Strategy for Tanzania* (Addis Ababa: International Labour Office, Jobs and Skills Programme for Africa, 1982); Michael F. Lofchie, "Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalisation in Tanzania," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16, no. 3 (September 1978): 451–75; and United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture, *The Tanzania National Agricultural Policy (Final Report)* (Dar es Salaam: Printpak, 1982).

mittee, did delay for 2 years the adoption of the new policies, and some proposals were rejected. Ultimately, however, it was the party that acquiesced. The ministry responsible for education, which a decade ago was renamed the Ministry of National Education to assert the importance of the political role over the technical responsibilities of education, has again become the Ministry of Education. At the same time, colleges of national education have resumed their former name of teachers' colleges. Regarding education in primarily technical-administrative rather than political terms has been supported by most of the numerous external educational advisers to Tanzania, especially the World Bank and Unesco.

This transition—from the proudly political to the aggressively apolitical, from self-consciously socialist to dispassionately neutral, from “education as social transformation” to “education as the transmission of skills and attitudes”—is nicely captured in the contrasting language of the 1974 Musoma Resolution and the 1984 report of the Presidential Commission. Both begin with a reference to Nyerere's 1967 paper “Education for Self Reliance.” At Musoma in 1974 it seemed essential to go beyond Nyerere's vision. By 1984, it was deemed essential to return to it. The Musoma Resolution states that “the main purpose of education is to enable man to liberate himself. . . . Education ought to enable whoever acquires it to fight against oppression, and the only way of doing this is to establish socialism.”³⁸ The approved recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education state that, “basically, the aims and objectives of education in Tanzania remain the same as outlined by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere in his booklet, ‘Education for Self Reliance,’ published in 1967. . . . These . . . shall form the cornerstones of our educational plans and practices as we approach the twenty-first century.”³⁹

It would, of course, be quite erroneous to assume that what I have termed here the political orientation is unconcerned with issues of technique and administration or is indifferent to the academic quality of educational institutions. It would be equally erroneous to assume that the current political configuration is either immutable or immortal. My point here is simply that recent educational policies correspond to the current dominance of a more technical-administrative and a less political perspective in national politics.

Conflict and the Consolidation of Power

As I noted at the outset, nearly everyone regards education as the most important policy arena, at least in the short term. Socialists expect the schools to mold new attitudes. Planners expect the schools to produce

³⁸ TANU National Executive Committee (n. 7 above), p. 103.

³⁹ United Republic of Tanzania, *Educational System in Tanzania towards the Year 2000* (n. 29 above), pp. 1–3.

required skills and increase productivity. Employers expect the schools to do the hiring preselection as well as to provide training and instill discipline. Politicians expect the schools to reinforce legitimacy both through the expansion of the schools themselves and through political education within the schools. Students and their parents expect the schools to offer a route off the farm and into higher income. All expect schools to matter—to make the future quite different from the present.

The persistence of private influence in the various dimensions of this key public allocation is, therefore, striking. Perhaps even more striking are the links between private organizations (especially the churches) and local political participation. The assertion of strong central control in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved both nationalizing private schools and dismantling local government and cooperatives. Popular initiatives that are focused on schooling in the 1980s have, at least in Kilimanjaro, fostered the reconstruction of local government and cooperatives even before they had official sanction.

Public policies, of course, both reflect the structure of power and result from conflict. The recent educational policy changes reflect the consolidation of the power of the bureaucratic governing class,⁴⁰ perhaps anticipating a moment of political realignment at the end of Julius Nyerere's tenure as president. They demonstrate as well the indirect and subtle process by which particular values and ideas become so thoroughly embedded in an institutional matrix that they are little challenged—in short, hegemony.

At the same time, there is no reason to expect the conflict over educational policy and over the direction of national policy to cease. Over the longer term, educational policy is marked as much by contradiction as by correspondence. Socialist construction has not been definitively defeated or even necessarily sidetracked. Education can be liberating as well as constraining. Widely expanded access to schools and the continuation of mass literacy programs do widen the recruitment pool and expand the scope of political participation. The government's response to popular demand, regardless of its articulators and their motives, is fundamentally empowering. Even as the new policies function to legitimize the political order, they also lay the foundation for challenges to it.

⁴⁰ Samoff, "Crises and Socialism in Tanzania," pp. 279–306, and "Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Power in Tanzania"; and Saul, *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, chaps. 8, 10.